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Ken Loach and the Save the Children Film:
Humanitarianism, Imperialism, and the Changing Role
of Charity in Postwar Britain*
Matthew Hilton
University of Birmingham
This article offers a critical assessment of British humanitarianism using a case
study of the ﬁrst ﬁfty years of one of its largest charities, the Save the Children
Fund ðSCFÞ. It is an exercise the organization was once keen to conduct itself. In
the run-up to its ﬁftieth anniversary celebrations in 1969, SCF decided to com-
mission a ﬁlm. Very much the “establishment” charity of the humanitarian sector,
it nevertheless made a surprising decision to approach the avowedly left-wing,
social realist ﬁlmmaker Ken Loach, who at that time was arguably reaching his
creative peak ðhis most well-known ﬁlm, Kes, was made in the same yearÞ. SCF
did not want a ﬁlm that simply celebrated the achievements of the organization
over the years. It wanted a controversial documentary to be shown on national
television that would highlight the problems of poverty in both Britain and the
developing world and that would go on to showcase the work of SCF in allevi-
ating suffering. Ideally, it sought to stamp on the public consciousness an asso-
ciation between ﬁlm and charity like the one created when Loach’s Cathy Come
Home ðaired as a BBC Wednesday Play on November 16, 1966Þ was followed
by the launch of the homelessness organization Shelter two weeks later.1
Precisely because of Loach’s prior success, SCF was happy to grant him free
rein.2 And while it hoped that the ﬁlmwould “reﬂect credit on the organisation,” it
knew it was not to be a “direct-appeal ﬁlm”; indeed, SCF explicitly gave the ﬁlm
company “carte blanche in preparing the theme.”3 Loach took the instruction to
heart. After he had visited Kenya to record SCF’s activities, it seemed to him that* I am extremely grateful to the following for their very helpful advice and comments:
Emily Baughan, Matt Houlbrook, Andrew Jones, Kevin O’Sullivan, Corey Ross, Bene-
detta Rossi, Kate Skinner, plus three anonymous reviewers and all the participants in the
AHRC “nonstate humanitarianism network” ðgrant AH/K002805/1Þ.
1 Paul Whiteley and Stephen Winward, Pressure for the Poor: The Poverty Lobby and
Policy Making ðLondon, 1987Þ, 46.
2 The Save the Children Fund Archive, Cadbury Research Library, University of
Birmingham ðhereafter SCAÞ: A66: Kestrel Films, 1967–69: AWE to PRO, July 9, 1968.
3 SCA: A43: Kestrel Films, 1969–70: John Graham to Tony Garnett, August 19, 1968.
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the charity was engaged in “a brazen act of neo-colonialism.”4 This, then, became
the principal theme of his ﬁlm. Loach took a position on the suitability of charity
358 Hiltonin tackling global poverty that has to some extent been sidelined, especially as
more recent debates—and high-proﬁle interventions by the likes of Bill Clinton
and Bill Gates—have unproblematically heralded the beneﬁts of “giving.” Loach
asked questions in his 1969 ﬁlm to which we might now return as both humani-
tarians and historians ﬁx their attention on issues of imperialism, globalization,
emergency relief, development, and philanthropic action.
The ﬁlm opens with contrasting images of the Lancashire town of Blackburn’s
social elite entering the Civic Hall and archetypal shots of urban squalor. It then
moves to a study of SCF’s children’s home, Hill House, contrasting the voices of
the northern, working-class children with the well-pronounced denouncements
of the children’s families by the staff ð“coal in the bathtub,” “just born lazy,” etc.Þ.
The ﬁlm then cuts to Kenya, where the frankly appalling views of some truly
awful expatriates are juxtaposed with rather typical images of poverty. These are
then used to reﬂect on the social backgrounds of Kenyan boys who—it is strongly
implied—have been wrenched from their own cultures and placed in what ef-
fectively amounts to an English public school run by SCF ðand by a headmaster
Loach believed to have “shot more people in theMauMau uprising than anyone
else”5Þ. Here, the boys are banned from using their native language and made
to read books such asWhat Katy Did and Tom Brown’s Schooldays. Loach’s re-
peated shots of uniformed Kenyan schoolboys marching in a brass band serve
to reinforce the inappropriateness to the local African context of much of SCF’s
charitable endeavor.
The second half of the ﬁlm reﬂects more broadly on the problems of postco-
lonial Africa. It concentrates on the corruption of political elites in newly inde-
pendent states and the vices of the rentier expats withwhom they are in cahoots—
and from whom SCF is not disassociated. It ends with a complete rejection of
charity as the answer to social deprivation. Just in case any doubts remained about
Loach’s message, the ﬁnal words are given to a Lancashire political activist who
explicitly tells the viewer that “the solution to the problem does not exist with
the framework of capitalism” and that charities are simply “stretcher-bearers”
who “help bandage the wounds” and “divert our attention from the real cause of
racialism, poverty and hunger, whether in Birmingham, Liverpool or Kenya.”His
message is driven home with the closing line: “First we must change the property
relationship of society, then we change man. That’s the only real honest solution
and all the rest is propaganda.”6
4 BFI Live, “Save the Children Film 1 Discussion,” September 1, 2011, http://www
.bﬁ.org.uk/live/video/700.5 Loach, in Anthony Hayward, Which Side Are You On? Ken Loach and His Films
ðLondon, 2004Þ, 120.
6 SCA: A43: Kestrel Films, 1969–70: “Transcript of Save the Children Fund Film,” 17.
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This was not a ﬁlm to endear SCF to its then patron ðthe queenÞ, its soon-to-be
president ðPrincess AnneÞ, or many of its socially conservative supporters. The
Ken Loach and the Save the Children Film 359staff of SCF were not happy. Loach has recently claimed to have a “faint memory
of enraged people in a viewing theatre.”7 This does not do justice to the subse-
quent anger within the organization. The polite version was that the ﬁlm was
“unsuitable for our purposes.”8 A more honest account was that the whole thing
had been a “disastrous experience” that had only served to produce a ﬁlm “that
might well be saleable as a political documentary behind the Iron Curtain.”9 Se-
nior staff variously described it as “objectionable,” “highly derogatory,” and “quite
unashamedly a political tract.”10 With morbid curiosity, some returned for second
and third viewings, only to continue to be “embarrassed” and convinced further
“that it was every bit as bad as . . . originally thought.”11 The political message
was blunt even by Loach’s standards, and it is worth noting that he largely
avoided making documentaries again, at least until The Spirit of ’45 in 2013.
SCF was almost wholly irrelevant to the ﬁlm’s second half, and even when the
ﬁlm pointed to some of the good work being done in public health programs,
Loach failed to mention that the clinic he was ﬁlming in Uganda actually be-
longed to SCF. The ﬁlm not only did little to reﬂect credit on the work of SCF,
as the original instruction had hoped, but it implied instead that the organization
was itself as much the problem as any of the other causes of the global inequalities
in the distribution of wealth. It is no surprise that so many were appalled. In the
ensuing legal battle, SCF staff and their lawyers analyzed every minute of the ﬁlm
in detail, objecting to the deliberate juxtaposition of images of poverty and af-
ﬂuence and the heavy-handed overlaying of political comment.12
And yet, however forcibly—even crudely—expressed, Loach did raise a num-
ber of fundamental accusations against SCF that we might use to assess the work
and achievements of the organization and of the humanitarian sector in Britain as
a whole. These accusations relate to the two broad themes explored in this essay,
which reﬂect the principal functions—lobbying and service delivery—of chari-
ties: their role in post–Second World War British society and politics, and the at-
titudes of charity staff toward recipient populations at a time when organizations
7 Ibid.
8 SCA: A66: Kestrel Films, 1967–69: Memorandum from Director General, July 9,
1969.
9 SCA: A43: Kestrel Films, 1969–70: Thornley, “Memorandum,” July 26, 1969;
Deputy Director General, “Memorandum,” August 8, 1969.
10 SCA: A66: Kestrel Films, 1967–69: SCFChairman to A.M. Crawley, July 19, 1969.
11 SCA: A66: Kestrel Films, 1967–69: Memorandum from Director of Fund-Raising,
October 7, 1969.
12 SCA: A43: Kestrel Films, 1969–70: Heath to Teitelbaum, October 28, 1969; Ken-
neth Brown Baker Baker, “The Save the Children Fund v Kestrel Films: Advice,” July 15,
1969.
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were deliberately shifting their operations from emergency relief to long-term
development.
360 HiltonFirst, Loach refers in the ﬁlm to charitable work as a “sticking plaster” and a
“ﬁre brigade.” In its failure to address the root causes of poverty he contends it
maintains a paternalist attitude toward the poor that is reminiscent domestically
of some of the worst aspects of Victorian philanthropy and that links aid agencies
internationally to all the inequities associated with neocolonial capitalist exploi-
tation. Yet this was rather a traditional critique from the political left that, even if
it applied to SCF, did not take into account deeper changes within the charitable
sector as a whole. By the end of the 1960s, many charities had professionalized
their staffs, expanded their support bases, and become the expert representatives
of their client communities.13 They positioned themselves at the frontier of the
welfare state, casting aside their traditional service-provision role and calling into
question the very bases of UK charity legislation, which sought to restrict the free-
dom of these organizations to lobby, advocate, and speak out on a whole range
of affairs deemed to reside within the supposedly noncharitable political arena.
Humanitarian charities especially were experiencing these changes. The ﬁlm
came at a signiﬁcant moment in the broader history of aid and development in
Britain and elsewhere. The year 1969 marked the end of the United Nation’s ﬁrst
development decade, ten years that had a profound impact on the UK’s human-
itarian and development nongovernmental organizations ðNGOsÞ. The organiza-
tions associated with relief at the end of the Second World War such as Oxfam,
War on Want, and Christian Aid had been joined by newcomers such as Tear-
fund and CAFOD ðthe Catholic Agency for Overseas DevelopmentÞ. These had
all engaged in an ongoing and sometimes difﬁcult debate about the sorts of issues
raised by Loach, particularly whether it was better to tackle poverty by providing
local services or by challenging governments to intervene on a grander scale, just
as the welfare state had done domestically in usurping the roles of many phil-
anthropic bodies founded in the nineteenth century.14 The result was that many
charities had deliberately taken a more political path. That is, despite the diversity
of their perspectives and approaches to the alleviation of suffering, they agreed on
the need to campaign and educate the public about the underlying causes of pov-
erty, thereby stepping outside their legally prescribed charitable remit. It culmi-
nated in several of the newer bodies issuing the Haslemere Declaration on world
13 Matthew Hilton, James McKay, Nicholas Crowson, and Jean-François Mouhot, The
Politics of Expertise: How NGOs Shaped Modern Britain ðOxford, 2013Þ.
14 Pat Thane, The Foundations of the Welfare State, 2nd ed. ðLondon, 1996Þ; Derek
Fraser, The Evolution of the British Welfare State: A History of Social Policy since the
Industrial Revolution ðLondon, 1973Þ; Bernard Harris, The Origins of the British Welfare
State: Society, State and Social Welfare in England and Wales, 1800–1945 ðBasingstoke,
2004Þ; Geoffrey Finlayson, Citizen, State and Social Welfare in Britain, 1830–1990 ðOx-
ford, 1994Þ.
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poverty in 1968 and several NGOs establishing the noncharitable Action for
World Development in 1969 ðrenamed the World Development Movement one
Ken Loach and the Save the Children Film 361year laterÞ.15 However, the decisions by all of these NGOs to take a more out-
spoken approach were fraught with tension and the divisions were by no means
resolved. The period in question therefore marks a crucial transition phase in
modern nonstate humanitarianism, and a focus on Loach’s accusations against
SCF provides a useful lens through which to examine some broader issues about
the limits of charity and the nature of political advocacy.
Second, Loach’s critique of SCF in Kenya struck at a more general and on-
going problem for humanitarian agencies: namely, the appropriateness of devel-
opment initiatives on the ground and the legacies of imperialist worldviews and
modes of operating. Admittedly, Loach tackled these themes through what ap-
peared at times to be some rather cheap shots. But this essay argues that there was
actually much substance to Loach’s accusations, at least in regard to SCF. Unlike
the other main British agencies that were founded during or after the Second
World War ðwith the exception of the internationally aligned British Red CrossÞ,
SCF was established in 1919 when the British Empire was at its height, so it
provides a unique opportunity to examine the operations of a single organization
over a ﬁfty-year period that includes both an imperial and a postimperial context.
The continuities in attitudes toward the poor and disadvantaged are likely to be
stronger in such an organization, but “the afterlife of empire,” as one author has
recently put it, may be found within the humanitarian sector more generally.16
Certainly, by its ﬁftieth anniversary SCF had become old-fashioned; some of
its working methods were anachronistic and it did indeed ﬁnd itself behind the
times amidst the new fashions of humanitarian intervention. The hurtfulness of
Loach’s accusations probably lay behind the root-and-branch review of its oper-
ations it undertook just two years later. But more than this, the imperial and post-
imperial humanitarian perspectives are not so dissimilar, and there are implica-
tions for other charities too. Most generally, SCF’s work actually perpetuated the
imagined divisions between a benevolent, afﬂuent North and a grateful, impover-
ished South. Here especially the well-known problems that critics have raised in
connection with all humanitarian groups’ representations of suffering and of the
developed world were not speciﬁc to SCF and have by no means been resolved
several decades later.
15 Haslemere Committee, The Haslemere Declaration ðLondon, 1968Þ; Peter Burnell,
Charity, Politics and the Third World ðLondon, 1991Þ; Brian H. Smith, More than Al-
truism: The Politics of Private Foreign Aid ðPrinceton, NJ, 1990Þ; Peter Burnell, Foreign
Aid in a Changing World ðBuckingham, 1997Þ; Matthew Hilton, “International Aid and
Development NGOs in Britain and Human Rights since 1945,” Humanity ðWinter 2012Þ:
449–72.
16 Jordanna Bailkin, The Afterlife of Empire ðBerkeley, 2012Þ.
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The archive of SCF was recently deposited at the Cadbury Research Library,
University of Birmingham, and its newly available documents enable a sustained
362 Hiltonand systematic analysis to be made of the organization in the context of materials
drawn from across the sector. Further questions may then be raised for other or-
ganizations, though their archives are either not so rich and detailed as SCF’s or
else have not yet been made available for academic scrutiny.17 The present anal-
ysis by no means constitutes a comprehensive history of SCF’s ﬁrst ﬁfty years,
but it is a starting point for demonstrating how history can show that NGOs are
not immune from the charges that have long been leveled against development
work more generally from both the left and the right.18 What follows is organized
into four parts. The ﬁrst traces the early history of SCF and the embedding of
approaches and attitudes toward the world’s poor that left a legacy for the or-
ganization in the 1950s and 1960s. The second explores the impact of war and
the increasing militarization of those engaged in emergency relief in Europe. This
profoundly changed the nature of SCF personnel, making the organization dis-
tinct from the new relief agencies such as Oxfam, War on Want, and Christian
Aid. The third examines the changing role of charities from the late 1950s and the
turn to political advocacy and lobbying by leading humanitarians; SCF’s more
traditional approach to its charitable role acted as a signiﬁcant brake on what has
been seen as the politicization of the humanitarian sector in the 1960s. Finally, an
analysis of the attitudes of SCF staff on the ground will show that there was in-
deed much to Loach’s observations. This gives rise to speciﬁc conclusions about
SCF’s imperialist legacies, but it also raises further questions for future research
both on other charities and more generally on the effects and limits of charitable
activity.
Finally, one additional issue needs to be raised: that of the attitudes of chari-
ties toward their own past. While a whole academic apparatus has been built up
around the humanitarian sector’s activities, these organizations are not known for
their engagement with historical debate or for an awareness of their own histories.
Historians and humanitarian agencies have only just begun to work together to
learn lessons from the past in a dialogue that builds on the sector’s engagement
with a whole range of other disciplines, notably the social sciences.19 The denoue-
17 There is an impressive collection on Christian Aid at the School of Oriental and
African Studies, though the materials relating toWar onWant are more scant; and while the
Red Cross is releasing ever morematerial, archives do not yet exist for some of the younger
bodies such as CAFOD. The most impressive archive is Oxfam’s, recently deposited at the
Bodleian Library, University of Oxford, which has been becoming available since 2014.
18 For example, Peter Bauer, Dissent on Development: Studies and Debates in Devel-
opment Economics ðLondon, 1971Þ.
19 C. A. Bayly, Vijayendra Rao, Simon Szreter, and Michael Woolcock, eds., History,
Historians and Development Policy: A Necessary Dialogue ðManchester, 2011Þ.
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ment to the Loach affair, which will be set out in the conclusion below, offers
some intriguing insights into how one institution approaches its own past. Usu-
Ken Loach and the Save the Children Film 363ally, for nongovernmental organizations, history is littlemore than amarketing ex-
ercise, a list of successes and achievements. But history can also be catharsis. It
would not be until September 2011—more than forty years after its completion—
that the Loach ﬁlm was actually shown to a public audience. This was in itself an
extraordinary amount of time for an organization to expend in coming to terms
with its own past. The fact that SCF then admitted that it had made mistakes and
attempted to explain its errors begs the question as to when such an organization
believes its much more credible present began. As NGOs point to the error of
their ways in the past—usually in order to justify a new, alternative solution be-
ing proposed in the present—it must be asked how long they are allowed to get it
“wrong” before they eventually get it “right.”
Origins of SCF
SCF has consistently been one of the largest humanitarian charities in the United
Kingdom. In 1969, its annual income dwarfed those of War on Want and Tear-
fund, placing it well ahead of the Red Cross and on comparable terms with Chris-
tian Aid and Oxfam. Its origins in 1919 place it between two of the main waves
of British humanitarianism. In the nineteenth century, faith-based bodies such
as the Quaker Friends War Victims Relief Committee ð1870Þ and the Methodist
Salvation Army ð1864Þ added to the work of the British Red Cross ð1870Þ and
older imperial bodies such as the Church Missionary Society ð1799Þ. Later, the
experience of the Second World War gave birth to Oxfam ð1942Þ, Christian Aid
ð1945Þ, and War on Want ð1952Þ.20
Although SCFwas inspired by the work of the Red Cross, its early efforts were
steered by its principal driving force, Eglantyne Jebb. Along with her sister,
Dorothy Buxton, Jebb created SCF as an offshoot of the Fight the Famine Coun-
cil, which had been set up to protest the suffering caused by the Allied blockade
of Germany at the end of the First World War. Wanting to do something more
practical than just campaigning, Jebb and Buxton used SCF to provide direct aid
and assistance to those suffering the effects of the war. While such assistance
opened up the organization to the charge of aiding Britain’s enemies, a focus on
children made it appear more politically innocuous and enabled it to attract cross-
party and cross-denominational support. Its greatest moment in its early years
came in its relief of the famine in Russia in 1921. Although part of a wider inter-
20 Matthew Hilton, Nicholas Crowson, Jean-François Mouhot, and James McKay, A
Historical Guide to NGOs in Britain: Charities, Civil Society and the Voluntary Sector
since 1945 ðBasingstoke, 2012Þ.
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national effort, at the peak of its operations SCF was feeding 300,000 children
per day in the province of Saratov.21
364 HiltonAs with many a nongovernmental organization, the early history of SCF was
bound up with the personality, energy, and vision of its guiding light, Jebb. She
brought to emergency relief an approach to charity that she had learned from her
earlier workwith the Charity Organisation Society.22 “Saving”was not something
solely concerned with the alleviation of hunger and suffering: it was also delib-
erately moral and social. She believed it crucial “to stimulate at the same time
the initiative and the power of self-help.”23 SCF had also to tackle the “root of
suffering,” which she identiﬁed as lack of education and sanitation. During her
last illness she rushed out a series of statements to reiterate her point that SCF
was about much more than immediate relief. In 1927 she argued that it was not
enough “to save them from immediate menace—it must place in their hands the
means of saving themselves and so of saving the world.”24 She offered a view of
development that eschewed overt ideological reasoning but nevertheless sug-
gested a massive philanthropic effort toward a long-term goal that foreshadowed
much of the development discourse of the latter half of the twentieth century.25
In a letter she had written earlier to Lord Robert Cecil, one of the architects of the
League of Nations, she could not have made her wider vision more clear: “Both
the combating of disease and economic restoration are undertakings bearingmore
permanent results than the temporary alleviation of suffering by charity.”26
If Jebb came from a philanthropic background, she also leaned to the Left, as
did her sister, who, with her husband, Charles Roden Buxton, left the Liberals in
1917 to join the Labour Party.27 Despite the range of supporters sitting on SCF’s
council and the number of establishment ﬁgures who wrote early endorsements,
21 Linda Mahood and Vic Satzewich, “The Save the Children Fund and the Russian
Famine of 1921–23: Claims and Counter-Claims about Feeding ‘Bolshevik’ Children,”
Journal of Historical Sociology 22, no. 1 ð2009Þ: 55–83; Kathleen Freeman, If Any Man
Build: The History of the Save the Children Fund ðLondon, 1965Þ; Emily Baughan,
“‘Every Citizen of Empire Implored to Save the Children!’ Empire, Internationalism and
the Save the Children Fund in Inter-War Britain,”Historical Research 86, no. 231 ð2012Þ:
116–37.
22 Francesca M. Wilson, Rebel Daughter of a Country House: The Life of Eglantyne
Jebb ðLondon, 1967Þ.
23 “The Outlook,” Record of the Save the Children’s Fund ðlater World’s ChildrenÞ 1,
no. 1 ð1920Þ: 2.
24 Eglantyne Jebb, “TheWar against Poverty,”World’s Children 7, nos. 11–12 ð1927Þ:
155. See also Eglantyne Jebb, “International Responsibilities for Child Welfare,” World’s
Children 8, no. 1 ð1927Þ: 4–6.
25 Jebb, “The War against Poverty,” 156.
26 SCA: EJ, Eglantyne Jebb Papers: A414: EJ 242, “Publicity”: Jebb to Lord Robert
Cecil, March 14, 1920.
27 C. V. J. Grifﬁths, “Charles Roden Buxton,” Oxford Dictionary of National Biogra-
phy; Dorothy Buxton, The Challenge of Bolshevism: A New Social Ideal ðLondon, 1928Þ.
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there was also strong support from the Left—from the suffragist Ethel Snowden,
for example, and from Robert Smillie, president of the Miners’ Federation of
Ken Loach and the Save the Children Film 365Great Britain. Indeed, the miners gave £30,000 to SCF in its ﬁrst year, an en-
debtedness that SCF repaid when it focused some of its activities on supporting
miners’ children during the General Strike of 1926.28
What such ﬁgures also gave to SCF was an “internationalist spirit” almost
utopian in its commitment to peace and the ﬂedgling League of Nations.29
Through combination with others—especially the umbrella body, the Save the
Children International Union, founded by Jebb in Geneva in 1920—the organi-
zation could work toward the universal goal of protecting children. A quarter of
a century before the passing of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, SCF
set out its own Declaration of the Rights of the Child in 1923, which the General
Assembly of the League of Nations then endorsed in 1924.30 Here, SCF’s ambi-
tion was clear: “the salvation not merely of the children, but of all mankind.”31
Yet for all its radical origins—long forgotten by its ﬁftieth anniversary—SCF
adopted approaches to aid and development that would shape its longer history
and operations and that Loach would pick up on in his ﬁlm. Four of these require
further comment. First, while Jebb ﬂirted with a radical internationalism, she also
did as much as she could to make her organization part of the social and political
elite. The donors she attracted to the organization did not share her ideals beyond
a basic commitment to rescuing children, and they would be ready to steer SCF
toward a more moderate course after her death. She and SCF also did little to
overturn the celebrity culture associated with the Victorian philanthropist. It made
several members of the British aristocracy the Bonos and Geldofs of their day.32
The heroic philanthropy of LordWeardale, the ﬁrst president of SCF, for instance,
moved the publicity ofﬁcer, Edward Fuller, to write a sonnet upon his death in
28 Robert Smillie, “Truth from theMine,”Record of the Save the Children Fund 1, no. 10
ð1920Þ: 147–48; SCA: Council Minutes: A1213: Emergency Meeting, May 14, 1926.
29 Hubert D.Watson, “ThreeDays inGeneva,”Record of the Save the Children Fund 1,
no. 2 ð1920Þ: 17–20; Percy Allen, “The Children of Europe,” Record of the Save the
Children Fund 1, no. 7 ð1921Þ: 99–101; SCA: Council Minutes: A1213: Meeting, Octo-
ber 7, 1920: “Internationalism.”
30 Eglantyne Jebb, “The Children’s Charter in Great Britain” and “A Children’s
Charter,” World’s Children 3, no. 3 ð1923Þ: 120–23, 146–47; Edward Fuller, “Great Brit-
ain and the Declaration of Geneva,” World’s Children 5, no. 2 ð1924Þ: 27–28; Eglantyne
Jebb, “The League and the Child,” World’s Children 5, no. 10 ð1925Þ: 153–55; SCA:
Council Minutes: A1213: Special Meeting, January 26, 1923; SCA: Council Minutes:
A1213: 44th Meeting, June 12, 1925: C.551, “Advisory Committee”; Philip Veerman, The
Rights of the Child and the Changing Image of Childhood ðDordrecht, 1992Þ.
31 “Outlook,” World’s Children 6, no. 1 ð1925Þ: 2.
32 Alan Finlayson, “Cameron, Culture and the Creative Class: The Big Society and the
Post-Bureaucratic Age,” in Retrieving the Big Society, ed. Jason Edwards ðOxford, 2012Þ,
35–47.
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1923 in which he imagined the children Weardale had “saved” coming to “pro-
claim your greatness.”33 For an inner core of early SCF staff, Jebb herself was
366 Hiltonthe ﬁgurehead that would be used to promote what they referred to as a “move-
ment.”34 Her death earned her the status of a martyr, and the early epithets—“the
white ﬂame”; she was “plus flame que femme”—merely preceded a number of
hagiographical accounts that persist to this day.35 No matter the changing for-
tunes of SCF over its ﬁrst ﬁfty years, its pursuit of elite endorsement would
persist throughout. When Elizabeth II agreed to be the charity’s patron upon her
accession to the throne, SCF’s reputation as the establishment charity was as-
sured for decades to come.
Second, SCF developed a relationship with the wider public through simple,
depoliticized images that tugged at the lowest common denominators of human
compassion. It is most unlikely that the mass of supporters who contributed in
such numbers in the early years wanted to do anything other than rescue starv-
ing babies, and the simple but effective images that the charity put out certainly
encouraged little reﬂection beyond the statement that George Bernad Shaw lent
to the cause: “I have no enemies under the age of seven.” Questions asked of the
public ð“Will you help save the children?”Þ, “appeals to humanity,” and constant
references to the “poor little ones” may well have raised funds, but they did little
to make the public aware of the causes of suffering, and they also established a
paternalist relationship between donor and recipient that the humanitarian sector
has never fully removed.36 Following the imagery associated with the sentimen-
talization of childhood in the nineteenth century, particularly by groups such as
the children’s charity Barnardo’s, SCF portrayed the child in a manner that stim-
ulated compassion but little else.37
Indeed, SCF’s publicity photography creates a link from nineteenth-century
images through to those of the starving child in the later development decades
ðﬁg. 1Þ. It suggests that no matter how aware humanitarians have been of the
problematic nature of such imagery, they also know what sells, and the image of
suffering passivity would be returned to again and again. Decades later, Francis
Khoo, the secretary general of War onWant in the 1990s, commented, “I baulk at
33 Edward Fuller, “To Lord Weardale,” Record of the Save the Children Fund 3, no. 2
ð1922Þ: 103.34 SCA: Council Minutes: A1213: 26th Meeting, December 14, 1923: C.338, Mem-
bership.
35 Freeman, If Any Man Build, 24; Wilson, Rebel Daughter; Clare Mulley, The Woman
Who Saved the Children: A Biography of Eglantyne Jebb ðOxford, 2009Þ; Dorothy F.
Buxton, The White Flame: The Story of the Save the Children Fund ðLondon, 1931Þ;
Edward Fuller, The Rights of the Child: A Chapter in Social History ðLondon, 1951Þ.
36 “Outlook,” World’s Children 5, nos. 7–8 ðApril–May 1925Þ: 101.
37 “Priesthood of the Child,” Record of the Save the Children Fund 3, no. 1 ð1922Þ:
54; Seth Koven, Slumming: Sexual and Social Politics in Victorian London ðPrinceton,
NJ, 2004Þ.
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the poverty of images in our images of poverty.”38 Oxfam, long associated with
the image of the starving African since the crisis in the Congo in the early 1960s,
Fig. 1.—“A group of children at an orphanage in Pokrovsk, Saratov Province,” Record
of the Save the Children Fund 2, no. 5 ðNovember 15, 1921Þ: 73. Courtesy of the Save the
Children Fund.
Ken Loach and the Save the Children Film 367had by the 1970s taken the decision to stop using such images. However, it did
so when much of its income was being raised collectively for the humanitarian
38 Cited in Peter J. Burnell, Charity, Politics and the Third World ðLondon, 1991Þ, 18.This content downloaded from 147.188.224.215 on Thu, 2 Jul 2015 07:44:58 AM
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sector through the Disasters Emergency Committee, which has continued very
successfully to use imagery of this kind in its appeals.39
368 HiltonThird, throughout its early decades SCF adopted an approach to social services
that owed more to Victorian philanthropy than to the universalizing tendencies
of the modern welfare state. That is, its solutions to social problems looked back
more to the containment and isolation of the workhouse than to the redistribu-
tion of wealth within society as a whole. One of its earlier experiments in solving
poverty over the long termwas the establishment of a “work school” in Budapest,
run by Julia Vajkai. She “lured” the “little beggars” from the “dirty slum streets”
initially by enticing them with the promise of chocolate.40 The young girls were
taught basic handicraft skills and their products were sold in the United King-
dom.41 The experiment was regarded as a “success” not least because they went
on to become excellent factory workers according to local employers.42
The rationale offered for institutional care betrayed the prejudices that Loach
later picked up on. During the SecondWorldWar, SCF strongly opposed plans to
locate evacuated children in private homes. It believed the mixing of the social
classes in private houses would provoke too much “ill feeling.”43 It proposed in-
stead the creation of large care homes that could be turned into holiday resorts in
peacetime.44 SCF backed down only when the potential tragic consequences of
a bomb hitting one of its proposed concentrations of children were pointed out
to them.45 Instead, it became a willing advocate of the scheme to ship children
to Canada. After the war, it experimented with nursery centers for mixed-race
children, working with the West Indian cricketer-cum-politician, Learie Constan-
tine.46 All of these activities betrayed a willingness to assume that it knew best
what was good for children.While it may well have been correct at times, in other
39 Lindsay Mackie, “Oxfam Changing Child Plea Image,” Guardian ðOctober 6,
1973Þ, 4; Maggie Black, A Cause for Our Times: Oxfam, the First Fifty Years ðOxford,
1992Þ, 63
40 Julie E.Vajkai, “Work-Schools and Child Labour: The Budapest Experiment,”
World’s Children 5, nos. 3–4 ðDecember 1924–January 1925Þ: 49–51.
41 “In Budapest: Making Life Better for the Children,” Record of the Save the Chil-
dren Fund 2, no. 9 ð1922Þ: 141–42; SCA: Council Minutes: A1213: 50th Meeting, No-
vember 26, 1925: C.604, “Handicrafts Department Report.”
42 SCF, Annual Report, 1946–1947 ðLondon, 1947Þ, 4; SCA: Council Minutes:
A1213: 1st Meeting, January 19, 1922: C.20, “Budapest”; Freeman, If Any Man Build, 36.
43 SCA: Executive Minutes: A418: 8th Meeting, February 7, 1939: E.112, “Protection
of Children in Time of War.”
44 SCA: Executive Minutes: A418: 5th Meeting, November 1, 1938: E.69, “Protection
of Children in Time of War.”
45 SCA: Executive Minutes: A418: 12th Meeting, June 6, 1939: E.167, “Protection of
Children in Time of War.”
46 SCA: Executive Minutes: A418: 22nd Meeting, June 6, 1949: E.296, “Overseas
Evacuation”; Jessica Mann, Out of Harm’s Way: The Wartime Evacuation of Children
from Britain ðLondon, 2006Þ; SCF, Annual Report, 1939–1940 ðLondon, 1940Þ, 5; SCF,
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instances its actions could be based as much on prejudice as on science. What
Loach found at Hill House was the legacy of such a tradition.
Ken Loach and the Save the Children Film 369Finally, for all the internationalism of its support for universal children’s rights,
SCF also retained an imperial commitment to child protection that reworked tra-
ditional missionary duties of spreading civilization across the colonial world. Jebb
encouraged SCF to turn its attention away from the relief of hunger in Europe to-
ward longer-term development goals of better education and eradication of child
labor in Africa. She hoped that the organization would propose development ini-
tiatives for local communities “in harmony with their own tradition.”47 However,
when SCF actually turned its attention to Africa in the 1930s, it did so in a manner
that owed as much to imperialism as it did to internationalism.
SCF’s early discussions about Africa wrote into the DNA of the organization a
set of assumptions that would be elaborated upon when operations on the ground
expanded in the 1950s and 1960s and to which Loach would turn his attention.
That the knowledge about Africa among SCF’s metropolitan staff was highly
circumscribed in no way diminished their willingness to claim to “know” Africa
and “the African” in much the same way that “knowing the native”was central to
forming white British proconsular identities during the time of the empire and
beyond.48 Victoria de Bunsen, author of The Soul of the Turk ð1910Þ, sister of
Charles Roden Buxton, and cousin of SCF President Lord Noel-Buxton, took the
initiative within SCF to cast light on the “dark continent.”49 She helped organize
a conference on the “non-European” child in 1928 and set about making connec-
tions with a variety of well-established missionary societies.50
The organizing committee of the conference developed into a permanent
Child Protection Committee. It was chaired by de Bunsen and met from 1932
until the SecondWorld War, focusing on the key issues of child mortality, educa-
Annual Report, 1942–1943 ðLondon, 1943Þ, 9; SCF, Annual Report, 1943–1944 ðLondon,
1944Þ, 11; SCA: Council Minutes: A1214: 200th Meeting, January 18, 1945: C.2936,
“Executive Committee Reports.”
47 Eglantyne Jebb, “A Publicist in Africa,” World’s Children 8, no. 6 ð1928Þ: 74–76.
48 Bill Schwarz,Memories of Empire, vol. 1, The White Man’s World ðOxford, 2011Þ.
49 “Looking at Africa’s children,” World’s Children 10, no. 12 ð1930Þ: 221–22; Lord
Noel-Buxton, “Children of the Dark Continent,” World’s Children 11, no. 9 ð1931Þ: 167–
68.
50 Edward Fuller, “The ‘Non-European’ Child,”World’s Children 9, no. 3 ð1928Þ: 38–
39; Victoria de Bunsen, “For Africa’s Future,” World’s Children 11, no. 5 ð1931Þ: 88–89;
Edward Fuller, “Conference on African Children,” World’s Children 11, no. 10 ð1931Þ:
193–94; SCA: A1217: M14/12: British Committee of the 1931 Congress on Children of
Non-European Origin: Minutes: 1st Meeting, October 15, 1929; W. E. Owen, Interna-
tional Conference on African Children, Question IV ðGeneva, 1931Þ; Dominique Mar-
shall, “Children’s Rights in Imperial Political Cultures: Missionary and Humanitarian
Contributions to the Conference on the African Child of 1931,” International Journal of
Child Rights 12 ð2004Þ: 273–318
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tion, and public health.51 The committee’s deliberations betrayed most of the clas-
sic hallmarks of an orientalist imagination.52 “Knowing the African” was the key
370 Hiltonbenchmark that provided the conﬁdence to proclaim and to speak. For the com-
mittee, however, such knowledge was to come solely from the reports of mis-
sionaries and colonial ofﬁcials back in London for their vacations who were in-
vited to the de Bunsen household for an “at home.” Ignorance of a subject was no
barrier to forming an opinion, yet it was also ignorance that explained conditions
across the continent. Blaming conditions on “culture” was the stock-in-trade of
the missionaries and voluntary society ladies ðusually the wives of colonial ad-
ministrators who ran maternal health centers in their spare timeÞ who addressed
the committee and then wrote short pieces for SCF propaganda. The question
“why African children die” could only be answered through greater education
in “hygiene and mothercraft.”53 Shock and amusement went hand in hand as silly
cultural beliefs gave rise to funny misunderstandings that soon turned to tragedy.54
Alternatively, the most absurd instances of abuse that would be deplored in any
culture were taken as insights into the speciﬁcally African mental universe: “In
certain countries, . . . unwanted children are still thrown out at birth, either to
die, or, worse still, to be eaten by dogs.”55
While the Africans were “backward,” SCF correspondents were adventure-
some trailblazers who engaged in “single-handed”missions to remove the “shad-
ows of tradition” that hung over Africans’ own desire for improvement.56 The
civilizing mission was translated into the more up-to-date language of the League
of Nations: “trusteeship” meant caring for the Africans until they could “grow
up” and learn “European standards of hygiene, of education and of religion.”57
Indeed, it was the responsibility of organizations such as SCF “not to feel that the
welfare of the native African is the closed province of a small circle of experts”:
“the price of African liberty was eternal vigilance on our part.”58 At all times Af-
rica was taken as a homogenous whole, and what comes across is the remark-
able consistency of the SCF worldview over the course of the 1930s. Yet some
51 SCA: A1217: M14/17: Child Protection Committee: Minutes of 1st Meeting,
March 9, 1932; Minutes of 4th Meeting, May 18, 1937; Save the Children Fund Child
Protection Committee, Information Bulletin on Infant andChildMortality andAlliedQues-
tions in Non-European Lands 8 ð1933Þ, contained inWorld’s Children 14, no. 2 ð1933Þ.
52 Edward Fuller, “The Problem with Race,” World’s Children 11, no. 6 ð1931Þ: 115–
17.
53 Mary Elms, “Why African Children Die,” World’s Children 12, no. 8 ð1932Þ: 118–
19.
54 E. Dora Earthy, “Birth among the Mendi,” World’s Children 13, no. 9 ð1933Þ: 135–
36.
55 “Child Life in the Colonies,” World’s Children 17, no. 5 ð1937Þ: 69–71.
56 “AWoman in the Wilds,” World’s Children 13, no. 7 ð1933Þ: 102–3.
57 “African Children,” World’s Children 16, no. 4 ð1936Þ: 58.
58 Ibid.
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attempt was made to hear a different version of events. An occasional native-born
clergyman might be given an audience should he ﬁnd himself in London, though
Ken Loach and the Save the Children Film 371usually such visitors would praise SCF for its good work.59 Harold Moody, the
Jamaican doctor, chair of the London Missionary Society, and founder of the
League of Coloured Peoples, joined the Child Protection Committee and then be-
came a vice-chair of SCF and served an active role on the council. But, as left-
wing critics of his wider political role have put it, he did little to challenge an
imperialist worldview.60
From the comfort of their own homes, then, SCF leaders learned about and
made pronouncements on Africa. Key to this was an ability to take the moral high
ground. Child slavery and female genital mutilation were not discussed as topics
that ought to be addressed in and of themselves. SCF knew that other organiza-
tions were more experienced and better equipped to tackle these issues. Rather,
these moral absolutes laid the foundations for the development of a right—again,
not the right of the harmed to be protected from such practices, but the right of
the charitable to intervene more generally and to offer their own program of de-
velopment, which, it was claimed, would prevent such practices from occurring
again.
For all Jebb’s commitment to internationalism, then, the work of the Commit-
tee on Child Protection after her death ensured that imperialism better character-
ized the approach of the organization by the end of the 1930s. Indeed, there are
signs in these early attitudes toward poverty eradication that SCF would develop
the sort of speciﬁc initiatives that Loach would later bemoan. For instance, one
article found that “communal sense” in Africans made them ideally suited to the
English school system with its “house system, representing tribal units, each with
its pupil elders.”61 And when de Bunsen turned her gaze to the apparently similar
problems of the working class in the north of England, the solutions lay in small-
scale initiative and educational work in the appreciative “villages.”62 It is perhaps
no wonder that Loach would focus his camera lens again and again on the Nairobi
schoolboys marching pointlessly for hours in the Kenyan sun, or that he turned
to the words of an American civil rights activist who considered the plight of the
poor everywhere, regardless of color, to be one and the same. However, in order
to understand how these attitudes still prevailed, and whether they were indica-
tive of a broader approach among development workers, the continuities and
59 “Looking at Africa’s Children,” World’s Children 10, no. 12 ð1930Þ: 221–22.
60 SCF,Annual Report, 1942–1943 ðLondon, 1943Þ, 15; SCA:CouncilMinutes:A1214:
190th Meeting, July 16, 1942: C.2760, Nomination to Council; 197th Meeting, April 20,
1944: C.2887, Child Protection Committee.
61 P. E., “Making ‘Good Africans,’” World’s Children 11, no. 2 ð1930Þ: 29–30.
62 Victoria de Bunsen, “HowCan You Change the North?”World’s Children 16, no. 10
ð1936Þ: 149–50.
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changes affecting both SCF and the humanitarian sector in the SecondWorldWar
and after ﬁrst need to be examined.
372 HiltonWar and Decolonization
The Second World War had a lasting impact on British humanitarianism. Once
hostilities commenced, concerns began to be expressed for innocent victims suf-
fering from the effects of occupation and blockades. Just as SCF had been set up
at the end of the First World War to respond to the needs of such people, so a host
of famine relief committees were established around the country in the early
1940s. The most enduring was that which began at a meeting in October 1942 in
Oxford organized by, among others, the Anglican Canon Richard Milford, the
classicist scholar Gilbert Murray, and the Quaker-inspired philanthropist Cecil
Jackson-Cole. While others disbanded from 1945, the Oxford Committee con-
tinued, eventually changing its title to the abbreviation used on its telex machine,
Oxfam.
Christian Aid also had its origins in the war. The World Council of Churches
ðWCCÞ, set up in 1937, established the Department of Reconstruction and Inter-
Church Aid ðalternatively termed Christian Reconstruction in EuropeÞ in 1945.
This became a department of the British Council of Churches, eventually chang-
ing its name to Christian Aid in 1964 as it identiﬁed itself with the increasingly
prominent “Christian Aid week” begun in 1957.63 At the same time, the social-
ist publisher Victor Gollancz launched a number of peace initiatives such as
the Save Europe Now campaign of 1945. Later, his Association for World Peace
brought together various liberals, progressives, and Fabians with Labour mem-
bers of Parliament such as the future Prime Minister Harold Wilson, who would
chair the committee that produced the founding pamphlet of War on Want in
1952.64
Such organizations were but one part of a wider shift in humanitarianism, and
not only in Britain. The 1940s are usually regarded as a pivotal moment in the
history of development. The response to the massive refugee problem at the end
of the war created an intergovernmental machinery spearheaded by the United
Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration ðUNRRA, 1943Þ. This was fol-
lowed by the emergence of the modern technocratic aid regime triggered by Pres-
ident Truman’s Four Point speech of January 1949, which introduced the concept
of “underdevelopment” and committed the United States to promoting economic
63 Janet Lacey, Christian Aid ðLondon, 1961Þ, 7–9; Michael Taylor, Not Angels but
Agencies: The Ecumenical Response to Poverty ðLondon, 1995Þ, 5–7.
64 Association for World Peace, War on Want: A Plan for World Development ðLon-
don, 1952Þ; Mark Luetchford and Peter Burns,Waging the War on Want: 50 Years of Cam-
paign against World Poverty ðLondon, 2003Þ.
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growth throughout the developing world.65 Amidst such a context, older faith-
based, nonstate, and often voluntary organizations are supposed to have become
Ken Loach and the Save the Children Film 373anachronistic as mission and empire were superseded by the newworld of expert-
driven professionalism.66
Recent work, however, has challenged us to examine the continuities across the
two periods and the persistence of imperialist and missionary institutional struc-
tures and worldviews.67 Most clearly, religion continued to inspire humanitar-
ianism, and not only through Christian Aid, CAFOD, and Tearfund ðoriginally
the Evangelical Alliance Relief FundCommitteeÞ. BothOxfam andWar onWant,
for instance, relied on the support of various faith groups, especially Quakers,
though prominent Anglican clergymen were often key to their establishment:
Canon John Collins helped found War on Want as well as going on to help set
up the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.68 When these organizations began
their relief operations on the ground they frequently turned to the institutional
structures set up by previous missionary endeavors. Oxfam’s early projects in-
cluded channeling funds to Quaker teaching colleges in Greece and to the YMCA
ðYoungMen’s ChristianAssociationÞ in Palestine andKorea.When famine struck
in Bihar, India, in 1951, Oxfam had to ﬁnd a partner to work with, eventually set-
tling on a famine relief committee run by the wife of the Bishop of Bhagalpur.69
Likewise, the whole transition from colonialism to developmentalism could only
be managed because of the local bodies of knowledge and expertise that persisted
throughout the decades of transition.7065 Michael Barnett, Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism ðIthaca, NY,
2011Þ; Gilbert Rist, The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith
ðLondon, 2008Þ; Gerard Daniel Cohen, In War’s Wake: Europe’s Displaced Persons in the
Postwar Order ðOxford, 2012Þ.
66 Ruth Compton Brouwer, “When Missions Became Development: Ironies of ‘NGoi-
zation’ in Mainstream Canadian Churches in the 1960s,” Canadian Historical Review 91,
no. 4 ð2010Þ: 661–93.
67 Rob Skinner and Alan Lester, “Humanitarianism and Empire: New Research Agen-
das,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 40, no. 5 ð2012Þ: 729–47.
68 Jeffrey Cox, “From the Empire of Christ to the Third World: Religion and the
Experience of Empire in the Twentieth Century,” in Britain’s Experience of Empire in the
Twentieth Century, ed. Andrew Thompson ðOxford, 2012Þ, 76–121; Luetchford and
Burns, Waging the War on Want.
69 Black, A Cause for Our Times.
70 Frederick Cooper, Africa since 1940: The Past of the Present ðCambridge, 2002Þ;
Frederick Cooper, “Writing the History of Development,” Journal of Modern European
History 8, no. 1 ð2010Þ: 5–23; Marc Frey and Sönke Kunkel, “Writing the History of
Development: A Review of the Recent Literature,” Contemporary European History 20,
no. 2 ð2011Þ: 215–32; William Beinart, Karen Brown, and Daniel Gilfoyle, “Experts and
Expertise in Colonial Africa Reconsidered: Science and the Interpenetration of Knowl-
edge,” African Affairs 108, no. 432 ð2009Þ: 413–33.
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In these early years of the new NGOs, their key difference from SCF was their
relationship to the actual war.While Oxfam,ChristianAid, andWar onWant were
374 Hiltonthe products of war, SCF adapted its role to wartime demands. Indeed, it could
be argued that in many ways SCF had a “good”war, as it tied itself to many of the
relief operations run by an increasingly inﬂuential intergovernmental machinery.
The signiﬁcance of such experiences, not just for SCF but for the Red Cross too,
was that SCF transformed its operations to suit a more militaristic ethos. It be-
came an organization run along highly professional lines, but one that deliberately
eschewed the internationalism that had driven its foundation. The right to inter-
vene was still there, but it was to be focused primarily on immediate humanitar-
ian relief and organized with all the hallmarks of the military efﬁciency one would
expect of a charity increasingly staffed by former army and naval ofﬁcers.
SCF was a willing participant in relief operations during wartime, ensuring
that nonofﬁcial humanitarianism thrived alongside the ofﬁcial agencies. It set up
its own postwar committee, which, from 1942, made plans along with fourteen
other bodies to establish the Council of Voluntary Societies for the Relief of Suf-
fering and for Aiding Social Recovery, later known as the Council of British
Societies for Relief Abroad ðCOBSRAÞ.71 This council played a prominent role
in ensuring that UNRRAwould make good use of the services of the voluntary
sector, under the overall coordination of the Red Cross.72 The relationship with
UNRRAwas not without its tensions, since many of the voluntary organizations
were impatient to have their resources drawn upon. But once the Red Cross had
been accepted as the ofﬁcial partner of the intergovernmental operation, then ul-
timately SCF fell compliantly into line with the more general relief effort.73
The sheer amount of resources available at the UN made organizations such
as SCF appear minuscule in this new era of humanitarianism. But one other con-
sequence of UNRRAwas that it forced those voluntary organizations that wished
to work with it to raise their game in terms of their professionalism and opera-
tional effectiveness. SCF was an enthusiastic partner in this new era of military-
driven and depoliticized relief. In contrast to its activities at the end of the First
World War, when it deﬁed the government’s unwillingness to provide assistance
to German civilians, SCF in the 1940s chose not to do anything that might ap-
71 SCA: CouncilMinutes: A1214: 191st Meeting, October 22, 1942: C.2786, Report of
Post-War Committee; 192nd Meeting, January 21, 1943: C.2803, Report of Post-War
Committee.
72 SCF,Annual Report, 1943–1944 ðLondon, 1944Þ, 7; SCA: ExecutiveMinutes: A419:
82nd Meeting, June 8, 1944: E.1214, Council of British Societies for Relief Abroad;
83rd Meeting, July 13, 1944: E.1239, Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation.
73 SCA: Executive Minutes: A419: 87th Meeting, December 14, 1944: E.1326, For-
eign Relief and Rehabilitation; 88th Meeting, January 11, 1945: E.1338, Foreign Relief
and Rehabilitation; SCA: Council Minutes: A1214: 201st Meeting, April 19, 1945:
C.2956, Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation.
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pear controversial and certainly nothing that ran counter to the patterns of ofﬁcial
relief and assistance.74
Ken Loach and the Save the Children Film 375The result was that the character of the organization was profoundly changed,
and in ways that would make it distinct from the emerging NGOs of the 1940s.
While it retained its commitment to elite patronage ðthe appointment as presi-
dent of the Countess of Mountbatten, wife of the Viceroy of India, was but one
stage on the path to obtaining the queen’s supportÞ, it also began deliberately
recruiting former military personnel at all levels of the organization.75 Retired
ofﬁcers from the armed services took up positions not only on the Executive but
also as ordinary staff in all departments of the charity. By the 1950s the chairman
of the council was Captain Leonard Henry Green, formerly of the Royal War-
wickshire Regiment, and the general secretary was Brigadier T. W. Boyce, who
had spent his entire career in the army, in particular on its intelligence staff. These
two men stood at the pinnacle of an organization in which a military ethos had
begun to pervade every aspect of the work. Relief operations could be imagined
as military maneuvers requiring attention to logistics and supply rather than as a
reﬂection on the broader aspects of development after emergency humanitarian-
ism. The Korean War was a signiﬁcant opportunity for these men in SCF. Ini-
tially, Prime Minister Clement Attlee had told the organization not to intervene;
but SCF, eager to enter a “theatre of war,” bypassed the British state, using its
Commonwealth connections to obtain a foothold through the Australian SCF.
After the Countess Mountbatten’s visit to Korea in the spring of 1952, further
doors opened and SCF sprang into action.76
Once SCF began to undertake actual development work, early reports of SCF
ﬁeld-workers around the world betrayed the clipped tones of military personnel.
They quickly and neatly expressed the high regard for the excellent work being
undertaken by SCF staff and the difﬁculties they had with the less willing locals.
The successor to Mountbatten, Viscount Astor, for instance, visited SCF opera-
tions in Jordan in 1961. There he observed the “excellent work” of Major Derek
Cooper, a former cavalry ofﬁcer who had enjoyed an impressive military career.77
Back in London, the SCF Executive Committee drew inspiration from the Ryder-
Cheshire Foundation, which aimed to help disabled people through its Ryder-
Cheshire Volunteers, organized very much along the lines of a social national ser-
vice. ðCheshire himself was a highly decorated RAF pilot with a Victoria Cross.Þ
SCF proposed the creation of a similar group of “Commandos” made up of “the
sort of people who would be willing to go off at 24 hours’ notice anywhere in the
74 SCA: Executive Minutes: A419: 77th Meeting, January 13, 1944: E.1103, Future
Policy of the Fund.75 SCF, Annual Report, 1952–1953 ðLondon, 1953Þ, 1.
76 SCF, Annual Report, 1951–1952 ðLondon, 1952Þ, 1.
77 SCA: Overseas Department Papers: A145: Jordan: Viscount Astor, “Notes on Visit
to SCF in Jordan,” October 1960.
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world and report on emergencies.”78 They would be paid “danger money” and
would ensure that whenever any major emergency occurred, SCF “could always
376 Hiltonbe one of the organisations ﬁrst on the spot.”79 Ultimately, SCF decided not to
pursue this plan, but the fact that it was discussed reﬂects the operational logic that
had begun to drive the organization.
This was an approach to disaster learned on the battleﬁeld and geared toward
crisis more than rehabilitation. Moreover, it was an approach increasingly out of
step with both its own traditions and the wider humanitarian sector. The younger
organizations were marked by commitments to peace and internationalism simi-
lar to those that had motivated the Jebb sisters in 1919. Yet in the Second World
War and after, SCF chose not to work with what were effectively the inheritors
of its own founding spirit, the famine relief committees that gave rise to Oxfam.
This was despite the protestations of Dorothy Buxton, the keeper of the original
principles of SCF.80 When Gollancz launched “Save Europe Now” in 1945, the
voluntary societies connected to COBSRA rebuffed his overtures, feeling that
his campaign was too “political.”81 SCF even pulled back from its own interna-
tionalism precisely when the global context was attuned to such a vision. While it
had been a pioneer in articulating children’s rights within the League of Nations,
after 1945 it only half-heartedly supported the UN’s adoption of an equivalent
document. SCF tracked the progress of what would eventually become the Dec-
laration on the Rights of the Child in 1959, but it did little to encourage its en-
dorsement.82 It preferred too not to dwell on the new clauses of the declaration
that made commitments to the social and economic security of the child. It stuck
to focusing on the basic clauses of the original 1923 declaration—“The Child that
is hungry must be fed, the child that is sick must be nursed”—and continued to
use the original in its publicity materials throughout the 1960s.83
Having been an enthusiastic assistant to the emerging international community
in a time of emergency, SCF proved far less willing to collaborate in a time of
peace. In 1948, it reluctantly agreed to cooperate in the UN Appeal for Children,
78 SCA: Executive Minutes: A421: 214th Meeting, June 20, 1961: E.3796, SCF
Commandos.
79 Ibid.
80 SCA: Council Minutes: A1214: 196th Meeting, January 20, 1944: C.2867, Corre-
spondence—Dorothy Buxton.
81 SCA: Executive Minutes: A419: 96th Meeting, October 11, 1945: E.1483, “Save
Europe’s Children” Meeting.
82 SCA: Council Minutes: A1215: 248th Meeting, July 18, 1957: C.4032, Declaration
of the Rights of the Child: Appendix A: Notes on the Declaration of the Rights of the
Child; SCF, Annual Report, 1948–1949 ðLondon, 1949Þ, 39; SCF, Annual Report, 1949–
1950 ðLondon, 1950Þ, 4–5; SCF, Annual Report, 1953–1954 ðLondon, 1954Þ, 8–9; SCF,
Annual Report, 1960–1961 ðLondon, 1961Þ, 19–20; Veerman, The Rights of the Child.
83 SCA: Executive Minutes: A421: 233rd Meeting, April 25, 1963: E.3501, UN
Declaration of the Rights of the Child.
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perhaps understandably worrying about its own future viability if the UN were
to engage in such work.84 When what became the UN International Children’s
Ken Loach and the Save the Children Film 377Emergency Fund ðUNICEFÞ emerged as a proposal from within UNRRA, SCF
looked upon the initiative with some anxiety.85 These developments within the
architecture of an emerging system of global governance also forced SCF to fo-
cus its concerns on its international partner, the International Union of Child Wel-
fare ðIUCWÞ. Jebb had created the two organizations almost simultaneously, so
the distinctions between them were blurred, and in the late 1940s and throughout
the 1950s SCFwondered what the purpose of the IUCWwas at all.While Oxfam,
Christian Aid, andWar onWant sought to develop further their international links
and institutional connections, SCF retreated and then threatened to withdraw all
support from the international arm it had originally created. The split was only
averted when the American branch of SCF intervened and undertook a thorough
review of the IUCW.86
Certainly, the new military ethos within the organization brought some sub-
stantial beneﬁts. It engendered an administrative efﬁciency that enabled it to pros-
per in the decades after the war, especially through its extensive local support
infrastructure ðthere were over 600 local branches by the time of Loach’s ﬁlmÞ
and through its novel fund-raising schemes ðits Penny-a-Week scheme organized
with the trade unions on the factory ﬂoor meant the working classes were con-
tributing over 40 percent of all cash donations by 1955Þ.87 But it also steered SCF
in a particular direction, one that would be increasingly adrift from the rest of the
development community. While Oxfam, Christian Aid, and War on Want were
beginning to reﬂect more broadly on the alternative modes of development that
their small-scale initiatives were fostering, as well as on the broader principles of
global development, SCF eschewed any discussion of rights, poverty, social jus-
tice, economic growth, or internationalism and continued to view itself, like the
Red Cross, as an organization focused primarily on emergency relief.
This meant that when SCF did eventually turn to some limited welfare projects
in the developing world, it did so only with the backing of the colonial authori-
ties and in a manner that ignored many of the new approaches to development.
Moreover, it meant that many of the assumptions and attitudes articulated in the
1930s would be lazily carried forward into the postwar decades, especially
84 SCA: Council Minutes: A1214: 212th Meeting, January 15, 1948: C.3174, Execu-
tive Committee.
85 SCA: Executive Minutes: A420: 110th Meeting, March 13, 1947: E.1831, UN
Agencies and Voluntary Agencies.
86 SCA: Executive Minutes: A420: 137th Meeting, March 20, 1951: E.2359, IUCW;
156th Meeting, March 16, 1954: E.2670, Study of the Work of the IUCW; A421: 163rd
Meeting, February 14, 1955: E.2823, IUCW; Council Minutes: 1214: 237th Meeting,
April 8, 1954: C.3741, IUCW.
87 SCF, Annual Report, 1954–1955 ðLondon, 1955Þ, 5.
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when charities were invited to step into the social arenas from which the colonial
state had begun to retreat. According to Frederick Cooper, colonial policy from
378 Hiltonthe 1930s was reoriented away from a civilizing mission to one more explicitly
geared toward raising colonial living standards in order to improve the export
market.88 However, in the ﬁnal years of empire the colonial state drew back from
its new social and economic infrastructure, leaving new African governments
with an inheritance of “weak instruments for entering into the social and cultural
realm.”89 NGOs held attractions to both late colonial and emerging postcolonial
states, as they could take on some of the services that government itself was
unwilling or unable to perform.
SCF’s tentative ventures into Africa were therefore often prompted by requests
from colonial ofﬁcials—with whom they were often well connected—to respond
to particular local social problems. In 1944 Harold Moody was in contact with
the Colonial Ofﬁce, which was interested in having SCF set up operations in
West Africa. With an optimism that would characterize so many one-size-ﬁts-all
development initiatives, they looked for a project that would “demonstrate to the
whole of Africa what could be done if money was wisely and efﬁciently spent.”90
They agreed that SCF should run a welfare center in Ibadan, Nigeria, to provide
care for infants and “guidance on mothercraft for their mothers.”91 Elsewhere,
in Malaya, it established the Serandah Boys’ Home for around 200 orphans in
1946, and in Jamaica it set up a health center named after Eglantyne Jebb.92 The
move into development projects was ad hoc and piecemeal, though there was
a deliberate decision to undertake work of various kinds, especially as it realized
there was going to be spare capacity after the work in Europe wound down. In
1949, SCF leaders wrote directly to the governor of Sudan to ask if the organi-
zation could “give any useful help in that territory.”93 They did the same for
Uganda, though there they were able to write to the education ofﬁcer, Bernard de
Bunsen—son of Victoria de Bunsen, who had led SCF’s earlier exploration of
African issues.
Colonial administrators responded positively. While lower ofﬁcials in the
Sudan argued that relief work was unnecessary since “the Mahommedans keep
88 Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard, “Introduction,” in International Development
and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge, ed. Cooper and
Packard ðBerkeley, 1997Þ, 1–41, 13.
89 Cooper, Africa since 1940, 4.
90 SCA: Council Minutes: A1214: 197th Meeting, April 20, 1944: C.2887, Child
Protection Committee.
91 SCF, Annual Report, 1943–1944 ðLondon, 1944Þ, 11.
92 SCF, Annual Report, 1946–1947 ðLondon, 1947Þ, 8; SCA: Council Minutes: A1214:
203rd Meeting, October 18, 1945: C.2999, Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Section.
93 SCA: Executive Minutes: A420: 122ndMeeting, February 22, 1949: E.2153, Future
SCF Work.
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their children much better than the English,” the governor general disagreed, and
he invited SCF to embark upon the “great adventure” and “mission” of maternity
Ken Loach and the Save the Children Film 379and child welfare work in the south of the country.94 In Somaliland, SCF set up a
welfare scheme for homeless boys “at the behest of the Colonial Government,”
and in Uganda it looked into setting up a home for abandoned children “at the
request of the Governor of the Uganda Protectorate, Sir Frederick Crawford.”95
When these territories became independent states, the relationships often
continued with the new rulers. For instance, after the Somaliland Protectorate
became independent in 1960 ð joining with SomaliaÞ, the new government min-
isters asked SCF to continue its work in Hargesia and agreed to contribute ﬁ-
nancially on the same scale as the protectorate government had done. In recog-
nition of the smooth transition and the ease with which the NGO could work
with the new state, the Somali president was made head of the Somaliland SCF.96
Likewise, work in Nigeria continued on the same scale after independence in
1960. In 1963, while an impoverished Nigerian Ministry of Health was cutting
its own services and funding of hospitals, it reiterated to an SCF representative
that it believed SCF’s training of community nurses was “one of the most vital
jobs in the country.”97 SCF was not as enthusiastic as the other NGOs in the turn
to development, but its point of entry into Africa was driven as much by its elite
and ofﬁcial contacts as by its concerns for the alleviation of poverty. Moreover,
and as will be explored in further detail, it began its work in Africa with a staff
schooled in the immediacy of wartime emergency rather than the sober reﬂec-
tions of long-term development planning. Acting primarily from amilitary-driven
desire to get the job done, without reexamining its operating principles, the or-
ganization allowed its long-held assumptions—especially about Africa and the
Africans—to go unchallenged.
Advocacy and Charity
As SCF staff began tentatively to enter the world of long-term development proj-
ects, they did so at a timewhen the humanitarian sector—and NGOs as a whole—
were transforming their role. While the emergence of the British welfare state
had seemingly removed much of the need for the traditional voluntary society
engaged in the provision of social services, a new class of expert-driven profes-
sional staff was engaged in reimagining a role for a whole host of charitable
94 SCA: Council Minutes: A1214: 222nd Meeting, July 19, 1950: C.3439, Foreign
Relief Committee; SCF, Annual Report, 1949–1950 ðLondon, 1950Þ, 9.
95 SCF, Annual Report, 1950–1951 ðLondon, 1951Þ, 24; SCF, Annual Report, 1958–
59 ðLondon, 1959Þ, 8.
96 SCF, Annual Report, 1959–1960 ðLondon, 1960Þ, 1.
97 SCA: A163: File: Nigeria 1963 ðPart 1Þ: “Report on Nigeria by Lady Alexandra
Metcalfe.”
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organizations. Just as expertise drove forward the social and economic planning
initiatives of the post–Second World War, so too did doctors and lawyers, en-
380 Hiltongineers and economists, teachers and social workers begin to populate the of-
ﬁces of charities to make these organizations as much a part of the professional
society as anything created by the private and public sectors. Indeed, in order to
make up for his neglect of voluntary organizations, the architect of British wel-
farism, William Beveridge, returned to what he saw as the rich traditions and
still relevant work of Victorian philanthropy in the third volume of his trilogy on
the postwar world.98 It would be but one of many interventions that sought to
capture a constantly evolving and ever-expanding charitable sector in the latter
half of the twentieth century.99
This is not to say that charities did not continue to be motivated by questions
of injustice, philanthropy, religion, and care for those less fortunate, but it did
mean they now combined such emotions with expert knowledge. In the human-
itarian sector, Oxfam quickly cast off its Quaker inspiration and embraced the
technocratic world of engineers, social planners, and economists, while in its
appeals to the public it broke new ground in hiring professional marketing staff.
While Christian Aid’s inﬂuential director Janet Lacey called on Christians to be
“at the forefront of the ﬁght for a hungry world” they were to do so in united
action with other professionals and expert development staff.100 From a rather
different perspective, War on Want may well have drawn inspiration from broad
socialist and laborist traditions, but it still funded and worked with professional
staff on the ground who were key to the early development initiatives of the other
humanitarian agencies.101 Even the VSO ðVoluntary Service OverseasÞ, which
was set up deliberately to draw upon the amateur spirit supposedly found in the
English public schools, soon gave way to a form of intervention that recognized
the need for professional and expert knowledge.102
This meant that these charities were quick to embrace the broader principles
of aid and development promoted by the United Nations, especially as the UN
deliberately courted the voluntary sector in the late 1950s. Indeed, the 1959 UN
World Refugee Year acted as a powerful stimulus to British NGOs. Oxfam, Chris-
98 William Beveridge, Voluntary Action: A Report on the Methods of Social Advance
ðLondon, 1948Þ.99 Finlayson, Citizen, State and Social Welfare in Britain, 183; Nicholas Deakin, “The
Perils of Partnership: The Voluntary Sector and the State, 1945–1992,” in An Introduc-
tion to the Voluntary Sector, ed. Justin Davis Smith, Colin Rochester, and Rodney Hedley
ðLondon, 1995Þ, 40–65; Matthew Hilton and James McKay, eds., The Ages of Volunta-
rism: Evolution and Change in Modern British Voluntary Action ðOxford, 2011Þ.
100 Janet Lacey, Christian Aid ðLondon, 1961Þ, 27; Christian Aid Mss, School of
Oriental and African Studies ðhereafter Christian Aid MssÞ, CA/J/1: Janet Lacey,Meeting
Human Need ðLondon, 1965Þ, 5.
101 Luetchford and Burns, Waging the War on Want.
102 Bailkin, Afterlife of Empire, 55–94.
This content downloaded from 147.188.224.215 on Thu, 2 Jul 2015 07:44:58 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
tian Aid, and War on Want were all eager to associate their names with such an
ofﬁcially sanctioned cause.103 This cooperation and pooling of resources and ex-
Ken Loach and the Save the Children Film 381pertise was consolidated the following year with the launch of the Freedom from
Hunger Campaign ðFFHCÞ, timed to mark the beginning of the UNDevelopment
Decade. In Britain, 1,000 local FFHC committees were set up and £7 million
was raised between 1960 and 1965. This campaign had a marked inﬂuence on
organizations such as Oxfam, reorientating the sector toward longer-term devel-
opment initiatives.104
In a related development, as organizations improved their knowledge and
expertise about social issues, so too did they become more aware of the under-
lying causes of the problems they were seeking to address. Most famously,
poverty in Britain was “rediscovered” during an age of mass afﬂuence as chari-
ties engaged in the provision of social services identiﬁed gaps in the coverage of
the welfare state.105 This has been identiﬁed as the “moving frontier” between
the state and nonstate sectors, as charities and the voluntary sector began to call
upon government to tackle a broader range of issues that their activities had iden-
tiﬁed.106 What this also meant was that charities moved away from their tradi-
tional roles and instead turned to advocacy, lobbying government and Parliament
for further intervention in areas where they felt their own voluntary endeavors
were too limited in scope to succeed. The poverty lobby has been the most
closely studied, but the phenomenon can be witnessed across other sectors too,
from human rights to race, gender, disability, and health, as well as, later, the en-
vironment.107
The humanitarian sector was not immune from these broader changes in the
relationship between politics, the state, and the charitable sector. British charity
legislation, stretching back to 1601, restricted the ability of organizations to speak
out in the public realm in a manner that might be construed as “political.” Char-
ities had to tread carefully as they expanded their lobbying work, especially af-
103 Janet Lacey, Refugees: Still They Come ðLondon, 1963Þ; Black, A Cause for Our
Times, 59; Luetchford and Burns, Waging the War on Want, 37; Peter Gattrell, Free
World?: The Campaign to Save the World’s Refugees, 1956–1963 ðCambridge, 2011Þ.
104 Black, A Cause for Our Times, 74; Anna Bocking-Welch, “Imperial Legacies and
Internationalist Discourses: British Involvement in the United Nations Freedom from
Hunger Campaign, 1960–70,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 40, no. 5
ð2012Þ: 879–96.
105 Whiteley and Winyard, Pressure for the Poor; Tanya Evans, “Stopping the Poor
Getting Poorer: The Establishment and Professionalization of Poverty NGOs, 1945–
1995,” in NGOs in Contemporary Britain: Non-State Actors in Society and Politics since
1945, ed. Nicholas Crowson, Matthew Hilton, and James McKay ðBasingstoke, 2009Þ,
157–63.
106 Geoffrey Finlayson, “A Moving Frontier: Voluntarism and the State in British So-
cial Welfare,” Twentieth-Century British History 1 ð1990Þ: 183–206
107 Hilton et al., A Historical Guide to NGOs in Britain, 33–78.
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ter the 1960 Charities Act gave greater powers of scrutiny to the overseers—
the charity commissioners.108 Humanitarian agencies engaged in prolonged and
382 Hiltonheated discussion over the decision to expand their advocacy work and enter the
political fray. In 1963 a frustrated Pete Burns jumped ship from Oxfam to be-
come the general secretary of the more overtly leftist War on Want. As Oxfam in
turn took on a more political role, younger staff impatiently pushed to increase
the speed of change still further.109 In 1970, the Reverend Nicholas Stacey felt
unable to convince his Council of Management at Oxfam of the need to be more
outspoken. As he put it in a letter to The Times, he felt obliged to resign because
he did not “fancy ½himself primarily as a fund raiser.” Such decisions meant that
the humanitarians envisaged a role for themselves far wider than that associated
with the application of “sticking plasters.” It also meant they would increasingly
fall foul of charity legislation. The commissioners would continue to monitor the
activities of Oxfam, Christian Aid, and War on Want through the 1990s, when
new legislation ﬁnally enabled charities to engage far more extensively in lob-
bying, advocacy, and campaigning.110
The approach of SCF to all these changes in the charitable sector was decidedly
cooler—so much so that it effectively acted as a break on the speed of changes
occurring within humanitarianism and the consequent redeﬁnitions of appro-
priate charitable endeavor. It participated fully in the World Refugee Year activ-
ities and welcomed the extra income that came through funded relief operations
in Jordan and Palestine and at the East German border.111 But while it publicly
lent its support to the FFHC, it proved slow, even reluctant, to extend its work into
the longer-term development projects that the FFHC was encouraging. Indeed,
it was anxious that the FFHC was forcing it in a direction it was uncomfortable
traveling. The sheer success of the campaign meant funds raised exceeded those
which could be spent on projects, and SCF feared it was being made to search
for projects rather than respond to need.112 When the initial phase of the FFHC
came to an end in 1964, SCF, unlike other NGOs, was against its renewal.113
108 James McKay, “Voluntary Politics: The Sector’s Political Function from Beveridge
to Deakin,” inBeveridge and Voluntary Action in Britain and theWiderWorld, ed.Melanie
Oppenheimer and Nicholas Deakin ðManchester, 2011Þ, 80–93; Lord Goodman, Charity
Law and Voluntary Organisations ðLondon, 1976Þ.
109 Black, A Cause for Our Times, 105.
110 Hilton et al., The Politics of Expertise, 196–200.
111 SCF, Annual Report, 1959–1960 ðLondon, 1960Þ, 19; SCF, Annual Report, 1960–
1961 ðLondon, 1961Þ, 16.
112 SCA: Executive Minutes: A421: 227th Meeting, September 18, 1962: E.3980,
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The FFHC, however, had acted as a catalyst for NGO cooperation in the United
Kingdom. In 1963 the British Red Cross, Christian Aid, Oxfam, SCF, andWar on
Ken Loach and the Save the Children Film 383Want came together to form the Disasters Emergency Committee ðDECÞ, which
has coordinated fund-raising during emergencies to the present day. But while
the other NGOs saw the DEC as a meeting of equals, SCF pushed unsuccessfully
for the joint appeals to be spearheaded by the Red Cross, in order that it could be
seen as promoting emergency relief and nothing more.114 More signiﬁcantly, the
FFHC had demonstrated to the sector the need to be able to act as a collective
lobby. First prompted by the new Minister for Overseas Development, Barbara
Castle, Oxfam took the lead in the negotiations that led to the formation of the
Voluntary Committee on Overseas Aid and Development ðVCOADÞ in 1965.115
SCF was opposed to the idea, though it felt obliged to join, fearing how an
“aloof ” reluctance might be perceived by the public.116 It insisted, though, that its
ﬁnancial contribution to the lobby ought to be minimal, and it repeatedly objected
to the more political interventions that VCOAD sought to make. For instance, in
1967, when many within VCOAD wanted to extend the organization into a more
general overseas aid council that tackled the question of aid from every conceiv-
able angle, SCF effectively halted the initiative.117
One year later, Christian Aid sought the endorsement from VCOAD of an
overtly political document entitled “TheAgencies andWorld Development.” SCF
expressed its “dismay and concern” and threatened to withdraw fromVCOAD.118
Knowing that SCF was still a signiﬁcant if conservative player, the other orga-
nizations wished to avert an open division. The Haslemere Declaration of that
year, urging an increase in the quantity and quality of British aid, was therefore
published under the auspices of the “Haslemere Committee” ða collection of the
leading humanitarian NGOs excluding SCFÞ rather than through VCOAD.119 The
114 SCA: A72: International Red Cross, 1965–72: Patrick Renison, “Preliminary Notes
for a Meeting of the Disasters Emergency Committee on Special Appeals,” July 7, 1965;
W. N. Hibbert, “Memorandum: Disasters Emergency Committee,” July 12, 1965.
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RefugeesÞ, 1965–72: A. E. Oram, Ministry of Overseas Development, to Colin Thornley,
March 5, 1965; Ministry of Overseas Development, “Draft Proposals for a Committee of
Voluntary Societies Concerned with Overseas Aid and Development,” March 1965.
116 SCA: Council Minutes: A1216: 278th Meeting, January 21, 1965: C.4801, FFHC;
SCA: Executive Minutes: A421: 246th Meeting, December 15, 1964: E.3776, FFHC;
248th Meeting, March 16, 1965: E.3819, FFHC; 25th Meeting, June 15, 1965: E.3869.
FFHC.
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following year, the more radical voices within VCOAD—especially Christian
Aid and Oxfam—pushed for the publication of A Manifesto on Aid and Devel-
384 Hiltonopment.120 By now, SCF had become well aware that the 1960s had brought
about something of a transformation in attitudes, and it realized that it needed to
appeal to “youth which was looking for progressive leadership.”121 Accordingly,
rather than threatening to resign, it pushed for a dilution of the Manifesto’s mes-
sage. When the other groups proved unwilling to tone it down, SCF again felt
compelled to threaten to resign even though it knew it “stood alone.”122 Once
more, VCOAD backed down and theManifesto was published instead in the au-
tumn by those who lent their name to Action for World Development.
The formation of this latter organization troubled SCF for some time. It led to
one proposal to break with VCOAD and the other British groups and seek in-
stead a closer relationship with UNICEF, so that it would be more obviously tied
to the cause of children rather than that of development.123 Tensions between
SCF andVCOADwould continue into the early 1970s. The problem for SCFwas
that while formally VCOAD was separate from what soon became the nonchari-
table—and hence more clearly political—World Development Movement, it was
obvious to anyone with little more than a passing interest that there were close
institutional connections between the two.124 At the same time, these same or-
ganizations were pushing to extend VCOAD’s remit to something far wider than
SCF felt it could endorse. SCF wanted VCOAD to be “a co-ordinating body and
no more.”125 It deliberately, and with some effect, worked to slow the pace of
change within the sector. Yet SCF became increasingly despondent about its
ability to rein in the now extremely popular developmentalist mindset.126
Around the time of Loach’s ﬁlm some of SCF’s decisions not to be “political”
appeared just as political as anything positively stated by the likes of Oxfam,
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Meeting, July 3, 1969.
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ifesto on Aid and Development.
122 SCA: Council Minutes: A1216: 297th Meeting, July 25, 1969: C.5224, A Mani-
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Eland House, January 19, 1971; J. P. Fonseca, Memorandum, July 6, 1971; Brian Morrell,
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Christian Aid, and War on Want. When several individuals and charities called
on the government to offer assistance during the crisis in West Bengal in 1971,
Ken Loach and the Save the Children Film 385SCF refused to sign, even though it was itself involved.127 For SCF, humanitar-
ianism was principally about relief operations on the ground in times of emer-
gency, carried out by appropriately trained—that is, military—staff. Such a def-
inition both held back aid agencies as a whole as they took these tentative steps
beyond the traditional realm of charity and profoundly shaped the nature of the
expanding welfare work that SCF somewhat reluctantly undertook. SCF claimed
to be beyond politics. But its very neutrality had the political consequences of
both diverting attention from certain larger subjects and restricting the collective
political presence of the sector as a whole. Moreover, it meant that SCF failed to
question or challenge the working assumptions that lay behind its operations in
Africa and beyond.
SCF on the Ground
Throughout the 1960s, the humanitarian agencies had begun to develop an alter-
native approach to development that favored small-scale, grassroots approaches.
Although many were not yet in a position to undertake activities themselves, they
nevertheless funded a variety of projects that were supposedly more ﬂexible and
better attuned to local circumstances than anything associated with the large-scale
technocratic plans of the UN agencies. This was the origin of the “alternative”
approach to development fully articulated by the NGOs in the 1970s and 1980s
and associated with the writings of liberation theologians, the consciousness-
raising initiatives of Paulo Freire, and the advocate of “small is beautiful,” E. F.
Schumacher. In the 1960s, though, early initiatives were launched that would
attempt to put into practice the piecemeal advantages of the microlevel initiative.
Oxfam and War on Want supported the gramdam land reform movement that
eventually led to the redistribution of land in 50,000 Indian villages. Similarly,
War on Want, Christian Aid, and Oxfam were all early supporters of Julius
Nyerere’s experiments withUjamaa. From as early as 1963,War onWant funded
the Ruvuma Development Association in Tanzania, and all three charities main-
tained their commitment to the small-scale, if nationally planned, venture long
after it had become increasingly authoritarian in the 1970s.128
However, in the detail of its work in the ﬁeld, it is apparent that SCF staff were
not inspired by the same trends in development thinking. Usually older than the
young volunteers increasingly attracted to Oxfam, the male ﬁeld ofﬁcers contin-
127 SCA: A41: VCOAD ﬁnance: UK Standing Conference on the Second UN Devel-
opment Decade, Letter to All Members, June 8, 1971.
128 Luetchford and Burns,Waging the War on Want, 53; Michael Jennings, Surrogates
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This content downloaded from 147.188.224.215 on Thu, 2 Jul 2015 07:44:58 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
ued to draw on their training in the military while their female counterparts drew
on their backgrounds in nursing, a key skill for tackling emergencies if not al-
386 Hiltonways long-term relief. What therefore linked SCF’s refusal to engage with the
wider political debates about poverty with its work in the ﬁeld was an approach
to humanitarianism that denied the existence of structural causes. Instead, SCF
ﬁeld-workers preferred to focus on the problems of individual ignorance and on
the ability of education programs initiated by their nurses and public health staff
to help the poor out of their poverty. In this sense, the attitudes prevalent within
SCF’s early investigations into the African child in the 1930s persisted, though
they had come to be expressed in the plainer, more matter-of-fact tone of the mil-
itary manner.
Repeated over and over again in ﬁeld reports, no matter from which country,
was the problem of “maternal ignorance.” Superstition and backward practices
were rife, and the anecdote served to condemn a continent. To select just one
example of many, Margaret Stears, a nurse working largely alone in Jordan in
1962 and with no knowledge of a local community she was being driven through,
found twin babies “completely covered in sheep’s dung—‘Arab medicine’—to
keep themwarm”: only a quick lesson in “how to wash” and “how tomake up the
milk feeds” from infant formula resulted in a return to health and a realization
on the part of the family of the beneﬁts of “the modern way of rearing babies.”129
With such no-nonsense high-handedness and an assumption of backwardness it
is no wonder that SCF staff could, without irony, teach girls and young women
classes with titles such as “why must you not use sand to powder your babies.”130
The approach here mirrored the attitudes of the Hill House staff to the British
working classes: it is quite possible that if the Africans had either coal or bath-
tubs, SCF ﬁeld-workers would have claimed the latter were used as repositories
for the former.
Malnutrition, according to Captain L. M. Brown, operating in Nigeria in 1964,
was “due to ignorance of proper foods all of which could be produced lo-
cally.”131 One year later, he claimed “the ignorance and poverty” had to be “seen
to be believed,” as though the two went hand in hand and no other factors were
of relevance.132 If only the poor could be educated, then poverty would disap-
pear, though he was up against “hundreds of years of ignorance.”133 Over and
129 SCA: A145: Jordan: Margaret C. Stears, “Jordan: Quarterly Report, April to June
1962,” 4.
130 SCA: A145: Jordan: Derek Cooper, “Jordan: Report for March/April 1960,” July 5,
1960.
131 SCA: A163: Nigeria 1964 ðPart IIIÞ: L. M. Brown, “Ilesha, Western Nigeria,” Au-
gust 31, 1964.
132 SCA: A163: Nigeria 1964 ðPart IIIÞ: L. M. Brown, “Ilesha, Western Nigeria,” No-
vember 1965.
133 Ibid.
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over again “ignorance and superstition” were the two principal problems “which
must be overcome before we can be sure that every child will have a reasonable
Ken Loach and the Save the Children Film 387chance of survival.”134
By focusing on one particular area of operations—Biafra/Nigeria at the end of
the 1960s—SCF’s emphasis on the cultural and individual factors behind pov-
erty is particularly striking. The civil war is a notorious episode in the history of
humanitarianism, the moment when many NGOs lost their “innocence” as their
relief efforts were exploited by the warring parties in ways that both misdirected
aid and prolonged the conﬂict.135 It brought to the fore the wider political and
systemic issues inﬂuencing the impoverishment of a country and made many or-
ganizations reexamine their working practices; it also gave rise to new groups
such as Médecins Sans Frontières in 1971. The continuities in SCF’s working
methods and its worldview during and after the conﬂict are therefore all the
more remarkable.
SCF already had a presence in Biafra when war broke out. In the summer of
1968, it was “shocked” by the reports being sent in from its administrator in
Nigeria. It immediately started relief operations under the aegis of the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross and provided the ﬁrst British team to reach
Biafra.136 So fast was SCF’s move into the confusion of a war zone that two of
its staff were killed in an ambush on July 26.137 However, SCF continued to work
through ofﬁcial channels, cooperating closely with the Commonwealth Ofﬁce
and the rest of the British government, which sided with the Nigerian state forces
rather than the Biafran rebels.138 It meant that while other organizations increas-
ingly sympathized with the Biafrans ðat this stage not knowing that stories of suf-
fering were being deliberately exaggerated by those they were seeking to helpÞ,
SCF and the Red Cross worked closely with the Nigerian authorities. It pulled
out of Biafra in November 1968 and then provided assistance and later rehabil-
itation in the federal territories.139 Some of its staff were uneasy about being seen
134 SCA: A163: File: Nigeria 1965: M. G. K. Dowdens, “Report on SCF Project,
Ilesha,” May 1966.
135 Black, A Cause for Our Times, 130; Alex deWaal, Famine Crimes: Politics and the
Disaster Relief Industry in Africa ðLondon, 1997Þ; Ian Smillie, The Alms Bazaar: Altru-
ism Under Fire ðLondon, 1995Þ; Kevin O’Sullivan, Ireland, Africa and the End of Em-
pire: Small State Identity in the Cold War ðManchester, 2012Þ.
136 SCF, Annual Report, 1968–1969 ðLondon, 1969Þ, 6; SCA: A164: Nigeria: J. V.
Hawkins, “Report on Visit to Nigeria,” October 30, 1968; N. H. Moynihan and Michael
Moynihan, “SCF Nigeria/Biafra Relief Work—Interim Report,” September 1968; SCF
press release. “First Save the Children Medical Team Reaches Biafra,” August 22, 1968.
137 SCA: A164: Nigeria: ICRC to Colin Thornley, July 30, 1968.
138 SCA: Overseas Advisory Committee Papers: A650: Minutes: 222nd Meeting,
July 11, 1968: ORW.4003 Nigeria.
139 SCA: Overseas Advisory Committee Papers: A650: Minutes: 225th Meeting,
November 14, 1968: ORW.4063 Nigeria.
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to be too closely associated with one side in the conﬂict, but SCF was more con-
cerned about maintaining its good relations with the British government. It was
388 Hiltonrewarded with many opportunities for further relief work throughout 1969 and
1970, working closely with the Nigerian Red Cross and the ofﬁcial Nigerian
Rehabilitation Commission.140
SCF’s principal ﬁeld ofﬁcer in Nigeria throughout the crisis was A. R. Irvine
Neave, a former lieutenant-commander of the Nigerian Navy pre- and postinde-
pendence.141 His conﬁdence in his abilities to assess a situation was impres-
sive, as was his understanding of the causes of poverty: “Nature provides all that
is necessary for a healthy development of the human animal indigenous to the
country, and yet there is the most appalling poverty, malnutrition, sickness, and
mortality in children that one could ever imagine. Why is this? The answer is
IGNORANCE.”142
Neave believed the way to move beyond such a “primitive society” was
education: “giving advice about food and health to the ignorant.”143 Kwashiorkor,
the form of acute childhood malnutrition focused on in parts of the Loach ﬁlm,
was an illness that could be solved not through redistributive justice ðas Loach
called forÞ but through the enlightenment brought by SCF teaching, “dispelling
ignorance and superstitions in the minds of the mothers.”144 A few months later
in his report on malnutrition he likened the situation to one of “starving in a
supermarket.” He railed against “the abysmal ignorance of the villagers,” com-
plained of “traditional prejudice against anything which is not established cus-
tom,” and made the following claim about kwashiorkor and marasmus: all “could
be avoided if only the mothers could be taught the simplest facts about nutri-
tion.”145 He bemoaned how often SCF saved children and returned them to their
families only to see them again a few months later because the mother is “either
too lazy, too ignorant, too superstitious, or too stupid to know what to do.”146140 SCA: Overseas Advisory Committee Papers: A650: Minutes: 236th Meeting,
November 13, 1969: ORW.4269 Nigeria; 239th Meeting, February 12, 1970: ORW.4329
Nigeria; 240th Meeting, March 12, 1970: ORW.4350 Nigeria; 244th Meeting, July 9,
1970: ORW.4452 Nigeria; A63: Overseas Relief and Welfare: Nigeria, 1970–72: John
Hunt, Colin Thornley, Brian Hodgson, N. B. J. Huijsman, Nigeria: The Problem of Relief
in the Aftermath of the Nigerian Civil War: Report of Lord Hunt’s Mission, Cmnd.4275
ðLondon, 1970Þ; A68: ﬁle: Nigeria, 1970–71: Note from Director General, May 11, 1970.
141 The Peerage: http://www.thepeerage.com/p31415.htm#i314145.




145 SCA: A68: Nigeria, 1970–71: Lt. Cmdr. A. R. Y. I. Neave, “Quarterly Report:
Malnutrition in Western Nigeria,” June 1970.
146 Ibid.
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The sentiments Neave expressed were shared throughout the organization.
Other reports from Nigeria at this time spoke of the dangers of aid dependency,
Ken Loach and the Save the Children Film 389especially among a people “in the habit of living in an easy way.”147 And as the
reports ﬁltered back to London, colleagues with similar military backgrounds re-
peated the cultural commentary.148 All too much of it smacked of the language of
“deserving” and “undeserving” that had characterized charitable activity among
the poor in nineteenth-century Britain. Given a military twist, it created an or-
ganization extremely effective at managing an emergency relief operation, but
rather blinkered in its reﬂections on the underlying causes of poverty and largely
unprepared to challenge sources of ofﬁcial authority in a manner that might have
undermined its own politically safe establishment support. Loach was forced to
visit East Africa because of the Biafran war, but had he traveled to the west of the
continent, it is unlikely that with relief workers such as Lieutenant Commander
Neave on the scene he would have produced a ﬁlm with a message any different
from the one he ultimately showed to the SCF Executive in 1969.
Conclusion
The questions Loach raised about SCF cannot be answered with the certitude
that he brought to the subject. Certainly the rhetoric of the ﬁlm ran away with
itself, and the charity was always going to be upset at its complete absence in
the second half. But in the denouement to the dispute between Loach and SCF,
there is much to suggest he had touched an extremely raw nerve. SCF did not
want simply to ban the ﬁlm. That would only have brought further negative pub-
licity, especially if, as it feared, Loach would have claimed in the press that the
ban was for “political reasons.”149 Rather it sought to ensure nobody could ever
see the ﬁlm again by hiding its very existence, and it showed an extraordinary
ruthlessness in the way it achieved this goal—by making Loach pay for his per-
ceived slander.
SCF decided both to suppress the ﬁlm and to claim its money back from
Loach’s company, Kestrel Films. A legal battle then rumbled on for months, and
it became increasingly obvious that SCF was not going to recoup its costs from
such a small production outﬁt. Loach’s solicitor realized his case was not strong,
and he offered to pay a nominal £100 and to hand over the ﬁlm, provided that
Loach and his producer, Tony Garnett, were allowed to hold a small private
147 SCA: A164: Nigeria: Gustav Weissglass and Helen Milne, “Survival-Medicine in
Nigeria,” January 1969.
148 SCA: A164: Nigeria: J. V. Hawkins, “Report on Visit to Nigeria,” April 25, 1969.
149 SCA: A43: Kestrel Films, 1969–70: Deputy Director General, “Memorandum:
“Kestrel”Film—MeetingwithRepresentativesofLondonWeekendTelevision,”August8,
1969.
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viewing to show “the industry that they have made a good ﬁlm.”150 SCF refused
and demanded £5,000 plus legal costs. By this time, SCF knew it could have the
390 Hiltonﬁlm returned, and some within the organization thought it best to let the matter
rest. But even when it learned in 1971 that Loach and his wife had been badly hurt
in a car accident in which his ﬁve-year-old son and grandmother-in-law had died,
it still pressed the case.151 Citing the commercial success of Kes, it pushed for
£1,000 while Loach was convalescing and grieving, a relatively trivial ðto SCFÞ
and hence vindictive amount given the expenses incurred and the efforts made
over the previous four years. Only in November 1971 did SCF back down: it ac-
cepted the token £100 and agreed to deposit the ﬁlm at the British Film Institute,
where it remained for another forty years before being publicly screened.152
That SCF was so thin-skinned was perhaps due to an awareness that it was
an organization out of step with the times. On several occasions it recognized it
was not appealing to the young in the same way as the more recent humani-
tarian NGOs. While Christian Aid was often referred to as “Oxfam with hymns,”
the differences between these two were much less signiﬁcant than those be-
tween SCF and the rest of the sector. In 1972, it accepted that it had created a
public image that made it “the antithesis of Oxfam andWar onWant” and realized
that some general stock-taking of its policy was necessary.153 It commissioned
one of its senior staff to launch a thoroughgoing review into “all aspects” of SCF’s
policy and public image. This indeed found that many people believed SCF to
be “rather old fashioned, very much a part of the ‘establishment,’ certainly not
particularly progressive”: in reference to policy, it was often accused of “not
rocking the boat.”154
It is tempting to see in this internal review of its work a ﬁtting end to the Loach
affair: initially defensive, SCF eventually admitted there was a kernel of truth in
the documentary’s accusations and that this needed to be addressed. Today the
organization would like to think that the strategic review launched in the 1970s
was the start of a closer alignment of SCF with the rest of the humanitarian
mainstream. Certainly, it does now collaborate far more effectively with its fel-
150 SCA: A43: Kestrel Films, 1969–70: Scollay to Hibbert, February 17, 1971.
151 Hayward, Which Side Are You On?, 129–30.
152 SCA: A43: Kestrel Films, 1969–70: Scollay to Hibbert, April 1, 1971; Scollay to
Thornley, May 10, 1971; Teitelbaum to Kenneth Brown Baker Baker, June 17, 1971;
Hibbert to Scollay, July 7, 1971; Hibbert to Scollay, July 13, 1971; Kenneth Brown Baker
Baker to Teitelbaum, August 16, 1971; Scollay to Hibbert, August 25, 1971; Hibbert to
Heath, September 15, 1971; Kenneth Brown Baker Baker to Teitelbaum, November 3,
1971; SCA: Executive Minutes: A423: 287th Meeting, September 16, 1971: E.4521,
Kestrel Films.
153 SCA: Executive Minutes: A422: 293rd Meeting, September 211, 1972: E.4634,
The Policy of the Fund and Its Public Image.
154 SCA: A85: File: Secretariat General: Director General’s Report, Fund Policy and
Public Image, 1972: W. N. Hibbert, Draft Report.
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low NGOs and is prepared to make its voice heard on the sorts of issues raised
by the Haslemere Group and theWorld Development Movement at the end of the
Ken Loach and the Save the Children Film 3911960s. So much is this the case that when a screening of the ﬁlm was eventually
allowed in 2011, the CEO of SCF, Justyn Forsyth, shared the platformwith Loach
in the discussion that followed. Admitting that it was “ridiculous” and “wrong”
that the ﬁlmwas banned, he also argued that SCF had become “big enough to take
it on the chin.”155 However, it is, ﬁrst of all, difﬁcult to test this claim. Far more
evidence would be required, and the speciﬁc research that would be needed is
not possible. Despite its recent archival deposition, at the time of writing SCF’s
legal team has insisted that only those papers relating to the period up to 1972 be
made publicly available.
Both the ﬁlm and this overview of SCF’s ﬁrst half century raise deeper and
more challenging questions about the history of nonstate humanitarianism. It
would be too simplistic to argue that SCF was completely out of step with a
monolithic aid sector in the 1960s. Rather, it represented one end of a spectrum
in a debate—in fact, a dilemma—that all organizations were having, both inter-
nally and externally, at this time. There were serious questions all organizations
were facing: about the proper role of charitable activity and the extent to which
they could intervene in the political arena; about the assumptions and precon-
ceived ideas staff took to development on the ground and how these notions
needed to be informed by the latest thinking in development theory; about the
relationships NGOs should court and maintain with ofﬁcial authorities, at home
and in the ﬁeld, and how these might constrain an organization’s activities. In-
deed, these are issues that continue to trouble the sector to this day and are un-
likely to disappear any time soon. There are no precise answers, though it is to be
hoped that extensive research using the recently deposited archives of many of
these NGOs might encourage further reﬂection.
I will raise just three of these issues here. First, what the assessment of SCF
does is challenge the extent to which modern humanitarian NGOs can be re-
garded as a post-1945 phenomenon.What the continuities in thought and practice
in SCF’s work do is cast doubt on any assumptions that imperial beliefs ended
with the foundation of the United Nations. The issue is whether the same might
be said of the rest of the sector. It is widely accepted that the legacy of empire
stretched to many aspects of British society and politics.156 As Bill Schwarz has
recently argued, empire was forgotten and yet ever present in British life.157
While NGOs such as Oxfam and War on Want might think themselves immune
to such characterizations, the problematic relationship with their recipient com-
155 BFI Live, “Save the Children Film.”
156 Andrew Thompson, ed., Britain’s Experience of Empire in the Twentieth Century
ðOxford, 2012Þ.
157 Schwarz, Memories of Empire.
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munities—often mediated by the older institutions associated with Christian
Mission—suggests that we might subject the whole of the charitable sector to
392 Hiltona critique of its underlying assumptions about the peoples and the cultures they
have tried to help.158 SCF’s penchant for institutional provision betrayed a whole
host of assumptions about both the British working class and the “ignorant”
African. But the countless alternative development practices put forward by
NGOs in Africa, Asia, and Latin America ought also to be subject to sustained
historical critique. The recent opening of further NGO archives, especially Ox-
fam’s, should make it possible to examine the relationship of the metropolitan
NGOs to their recipient communities.159 Had Loach made a ﬁlm about another
organization, he might not have found what he interpreted to be overt neocolo-
nialism, but he might well have come across world-weary ﬁeld-workers who
betray a whole range of other assumptions about the lives and beliefs of those
they have chosen to help. Indeed, more recent critiques of the sector have con-
tinued to put the charge that through their moral high-handedness and their ea-
gerness to intervene, modern humanitarians have much in common with dyed-in-
the-wool imperialists.160
Second, SCF’s position as the “establishment” charity, close to both ministers
and monarchs, raises ongoing questions about the relationship between the vol-
untary sector and the state. What is obvious in the history of SCF is that one of the
reasons its early radicalism was soon lost was because of its desire to maintain the
legitimacy conferred upon it by its impressive list of patrons and presidents.
Either deliberately through the membership of the council, or implicitly through
what SCF staff assumed their supporters in government might think, its close
connections with those at the heart of power constrained its freedom of maneuver.
Within the aid and development sector, the question has long been one of whether
NGOs are “too close for comfort.”161 The qualitative connections SCF had with
the establishment preﬁgure many of the more quantitative connections developed
158 See, for instance, the debate on partnership: Bill Cooke and Uma Kothari, eds.,
Participation: The New Tyranny? ðLondon, 2004Þ, 72–87.
159 One excellent example made possible when the Oxfam archive was previously
accessible ðbefore its temporary closure while being transferred to and cataloged at the
Bodleian Library, OxfordÞ is Jennings, Surrogates of the State.
160 David Rieff, A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis ðNewYork, 2003Þ, 61.
161 Michael Edwards and David Hulme, “Too Close for Comfort? The Impact of Of-
ﬁcial Aid on Nongovernmental Organizations,” World Development 24, no. 6 ð1996Þ:
961–73; Peter Burnell, “Debate: Third World Charities in Britain towards 2000,” Com-
munity Development Journal 28, no. 1 ð1993Þ: 66–81; Smith, More than Altruism; Bur-
nell, Foreign Aid in a Changing World; Doug Hellinger, “NGOs and the Large Aid Do-
nors: Changing the Terms of Engagement,” World Development 15, suppl. ð1987Þ: 135–
43; Tina Wallace, Sarah Crowther, and Andrew Shepherd, Standardising Development:
Influences on UK NGOs’ Policies and Procedures ðOxford, 1997Þ; Terje Tvedt, Angels
of Mercy or State-Financed Development Diplomats? NGOs and Foreign Aid ðOxford,
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with the rise of state funding of NGOs in Britain since the 1970s, especially the
Joint Funding Scheme launched in 1975 ðwhich was supporting the work of 120
Ken Loach and the Save the Children Film 393NGOs by the early 1990sÞ.162 NGOs usually acknowledge the dangers of accept-
ing government contracts and ofﬁcial sources of funding, but the question is only
asked of a moment in time. Again, sustained historical investigation of the
relationship between governments and charities can perhaps provide a more
compelling answer.163 Certainly the recent accounts of speciﬁc ﬁelds of activity
have shown how intertwined with the institutions of global governance NGOs
have become.164 The sniping that continues within the sector as to who is more or
less independent merely reﬂects the fact that the problems associated with SCF’s
conservative approach to charitable activity in the 1960s are relevant for other
humanitarian agencies too.
Third, in this era of heightened regard for philanthropy and voluntarism, we
might return to the older critiques of charity that inspired Loach and earlier drove
so many to build the welfare state. What is remarkable is that in all of the attacks
on the aid industry, the NGOs have largely managed to maintain their reputation
as the “good guys.” Their espousal of alternatives and their focus on the small
scale has meant they have always been able to suggest they have represented the
solutions to, rather than the problems of, the aid industry. Recently, however,
commentators have begun to realize that NGOs are neither the alternative nor,
in many instances, small.165 Popular accounts suggesting that aid does not work,
and that emergency humanitarianism too often prolongs conﬂicts, have begun to
appear in greater number.166 Some of the most recent have even begun to have162 Central Ofﬁce of Information, Britain and Development Aid ðLondon, 1995Þ, 24.
163 Michael Woolcock, Simon Szreter, and Vijayendra Rao, “How andWhy Does His-
tory Matter for Development Policy?,” Journal of Development Studies 47, no. 1 ð2011Þ:
70–96; C. A. Bayly, Vijayendra Rao, Simon Szreter, and Michael Woolcock, History,
Historians and Development Policy ðManchester, 2011Þ.
164 Matthew Connelly, Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Popula-
tion ðCambridge, MA, 2008Þ; James Vernon, Hunger: A Modern History ðCambridge,
MA, 2007Þ; Matthew Hilton, Prosperity for All: Consumer Activism in an Era of Glob-
alisation ðIthaca, NY, 2009Þ; Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond
Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics ðIthaca, NY, 1998Þ; Erez Manela,
“A Pox on Your Narrative: Writing Disease Control into Cold War History,” Diplomatic
History 34, no. 2 ð2010Þ: 299–323; Nick Cullather, “The Foreign Policy of the Calorie,”
American Historical Review 112, no. 2 ð2007Þ: 337–64.
165 David Ransom, “The Big Charity Bonanza,”New Internationalist 383 ð2005Þ, avail-
able at: http://www.newint.org/features/2005/10/01/keynote/.
166 Michael Maren, The Road to Hell ðNew York, 1997Þ; Roger C. Riddell, Does For-
eign Aid Really Work? ðOxford, 2007Þ; William Easterly, The White Man’s Burden ðOx-
ford, 2006Þ.
1998Þ; David Lewis and Tina Wallace, eds., New Roles and Relevance: Development
NGOs and the Challenge of Change ðBloomﬁeld, CT, 2000Þ.
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the NGOs within their sights.167 Work is beginning to emerge that analyzes the
history of humanitarianism and development so as to measure NGO effective-
394 Hiltonness, but further research will ensure that history provides an important contri-
bution to a debate that has long concerned so many disciplines across the social
sciences. Certainly, as income inequalities around the world begin to mirror the
proportions that existed in the Victorian era—the golden age of philanthropy—
then older questions that used to be asked of the limits of charitable endeavor
might once again be raised, if not so bluntly as in the Loach ﬁlm. Indeed, as SCF
approaches its centenary in 2019, it is tempting to wonder what another Loach
ﬁlm commissioned to mark this anniversary would look like.
Finally, to return to the opening point about the role of history, NGOs have
proved all too willing to admit their failures in the past only as a means of pro-
moting their new methods in the present. At the public screening of Loach’s ﬁlm,
SCF’s Justin Forsyth claimed that from the 1960s to the 1980s aid did “more
harm than good.” This was an extraordinary admission. Clearly, he wanted to
convey how far SCF and the humanitarian sector had traveled since Loach made
his ﬁlm. But if we add to his own statement some of the evidence about SCF in
the previous ﬁfty years, then it does beg the question of how long an NGO is to be
permitted to cause “harm” before it ﬁnally gets it right and does “good.” The hu-
manitarian sector is one that is remarkably frank in its admissions that it too of-
ten ﬁnds itself “condemned to repeat.”168 But this in itself is a claim that requires
further historical analysis. Why is it that charities and NGOs have gone on to
repeat mistakes and operate in ways they later believe to be wrong? History ought
not to be used crudely to learn direct lessons from the past. But in the case of
saving both children and adults, it might just be that history can let us appreciate
better just what has succeeded and what has failed. Certainly, from what can be
seen of SCF’s ﬁrst ﬁfty years, the organization was closely implicated in both
the advantages and the disadvantages of nonstate humanitarianism and long-term
development. Moreover, it was implicated in ways that call into question the high
regard that has continued to be accorded to the NGO sector as a whole.167 Linda Polman, War Games: The Story of Aid and War in Modern Times ðLondon,
2010Þ.
168 Fiona Terry, Condemned to Repeat? The Paradox of Humanitarian Intervention
ðIthaca, NY, 2002Þ.
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